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Abstract
Operation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) support many critical missions in the
United State Air Force (USAF). Monitoring abnormal behavior is one of many
responsibilities of the operator during a mission. Some behaviors are hard to be detect by
an operator, especially when flying one or more autonomous vehicles; as such, detections
require a high level of attention and focus to flight parameters. In this research, a
monitoring system and its algorithm are designed and tested for a target fixed-wing UAV.
The system is designed to identify divergent behaviors of the UAV resulting from
environmental or malicious activity. Also, the system will be aware of the dynamic
environmental effects such as wind speed and direction. The Autonomy Monitoring
Service (AMS) compares the real vehicle or simulated Vehicle with a similar simulated
vehicle using Software in the Loop (SITL). It is hypothesized that the resulting design has
the potential to reduce monotonous monitoring, reduce risk of losing vehicles, and increase
mission effectiveness. Performance of the prototyped AMS model was examined by
several measures, including divergence detection rate, synchronization time, and Upper
Control Limit (UCL) of aircraft location variability in different scenarios. Results showed
100% rate of divergence detection out of all divergent events occurred. The weighted mean
of AMS synchronization time was 4.02 seconds, and the weighted mean for aircraft
location variability was 44.8 meters. The overarching AMS functionality was achieved.
AMS supports the concept that humans and machines should be designed to complement
each other by sharing responsibilities and behaviors effectively, making final system safer
and more reliable.
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DESIGN AND TEST OF AN AUTONOMY MONITORING SERVICE
TO DETECT DIVERGENT BEHAVIORS ON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

I. Introduction
1.1 Background
A Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) is defined by the FAA as “one that is operated without
the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft” (Giese et al.,
2013). The highly automated UAV operate within Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) to
include the aircraft itself as well as support elements like Ground Control Stations (GCSs),
radio- frequency data links and Launch and Recovery equipment. UAS are a strategic focus
for the United State Air Force (USAF) and other international military forces for providing
significant mission capabilities while reducing to human operators. UAS technologies
evolve rapidly, where it seems every day there is some update regarding the system
architecture, components or applications. The tactical important of the UAS to militaries
worldwide has been characterized by AL and Kiniskern as follows. “The UAV is a tool for
taking the human out of harm's way for at least a small time period. It is this tactical
advantage for ground troops that has created the necessity for an expanded UAV fleet for
all services, and it is this necessity that has created problems” (AL & Kniskern, 2006).
Today, UAS play an increasing role in many military and civilian missions such as
search and rescue, reconnaissance operations, real-time surveillance, military training,
weather monitoring, hazardous site inspection and range extension, traffic monitoring, and
agricultural monitoring. As their use has increased, so has interest in improving automation
capabilities within these systems. This has been characterized by Ramirez-Atencia and
1

colleagues as follows. “The increasing interest in the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV) in the last years has opened up a new complex area of research applications. Many
works have been focused on the applicability of new Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques
to facilitate the successfully execution of UAV operations from the Ground Control
Stations (GCSs)” (Ramirez-Atencia et al., 2017).
The GCS and the Operator are very important parts of the whole system where
communication between UAV and GCS are the only way to monitor and control the vehicle
during a mission. Operators are performing a sensitive job by monitoring the mission and
taking manual control when the UAV is not acting properly or when automation does not
provide adequate functionality. The operator is assumed to maintain a very high situation
awareness (SA) to avoid UAV accidents. Monitoring UAV operations is not an easy task
and requires the operator must focus on many things in the GCS. Abnormal behaviors or
activities should be detected immediately whether benign or adversarial. However, these
conditions are infrequent and therefore the operators can love vigilance regarding these
conditions, reducing their SA of items which indicate the onset of these infrequent
conditions.
When a UAV is flying a mission, the operator may not be able to observe some
divergent behaviors. There are many parameters that need to be observed and this can lead
to excessive operator workload. For example, detecting divergent behaviors in waypoints,
location, speed or altitude of the UAV is important during any real mission. Various
options available to the operator include:
•

Return to Launch (RTL)

•

Reload original plan

•

Observation divergent behaviors
2

There are many important parameters in the Heads-Up Area (HUD) that can be missed
while observing the mission. Observing those changing parameters adds workload to the
operator, which can make it difficult to maintain vigilance operating the UAV. Figure 1
illustrates the information that the Operator needs to monitor in mission planner.

Figure 1. Mission Planner (Ardupilot Dev Team, 2019)

1.2 Problem Statement
Missing divergent behaviors while monitoring a flying UAV from the GCS can lead to
unsuccessful mission, injury or loss of life. It is hard for the operator to detect small
divergence through typical ground station software when there are a lot of parameters, or
the parameters are presented in small text in the HUD. Operators need an advanced system
to aid the task of monitoring a variety of divergent behaviors.
In this research, an Autonomy Monitoring Service (AMS) will be designed and
prototyped. Additionally, a Graphic User Interface (GUI) will be proposed for the UAV
Operator that will help detect abnormal behaviors and activities while flying. AMS will be
3

continuously monitoring and notifying the operator of any abnormal UAV behaviors,
displaying messages to Operator in real time.
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions
The main objective of this research is to design and test of an Autonomy Monitoring
Service (AMS) to notify the Operator of divergent UAV behaviors. AMS will work
autonomously in a GCS to help the Operator detect divergent behaviors and alert the
operators to the triggering of failsafe events.
The research questions are:
1. What is an architecture of an AMS?
2. What are the algorithms of the system for implementing AMS?
3. How will AMS be presented to the Operator during the mission?
4. How does AMS robustly use statistics of the environment and the UAV dynamics?
1.4 Methodology
In this thesis, simulation in SITL will be used to cumulatively gather quantitative data
to evaluate AMS performance. The data collection will be gathered from the simulation
and mission planner to provide clear results and analysis on utility and performance of the
AMS. As a result, the analysis will be largely quantitative with some qualitative
observations. Observations of AMS will be examined and evaluated under various realistic
scenarios in mission planner. The methodology will be a structured design followed by an
experimental study. Treatments will be given to the UAV through an error injection
software system which differ from the scenarios the operator inputs to the UAV. The
response of AMS to the resulting divergence of the UAV from the mission parameters
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planned by the operator, referred to as divergent UAV behaviors, will be measured and
assessed.
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
The following assumptions and limitations will be made to constrain the scope of this
research project. Assumptions to consider is that the simulated UAV, referred to as Vehicle
1, is assumed to represent a real flying UAV. A second simulated UAV, referred to as
Vehicle 2, is a simulated UAV. The behavior of Vehicle 2 is intended to represent the
planned behavior of Vehicle 1. AMS will monitor and react to any divergence in the
behavior or state variables between Vehicle 1 and Vehicle 2. It is the performance of AMS,
as compared to ground truth regarding error injects that will be the topic of this research.
AMS will monitor a limited number of parameters such as airspeed, mode, waypoints,
location, and altitude.
1.6 Preview
This chapter provided an overview of monitoring a divergent behavior in a UAV during
a mission and how one can predict those abnormal behaviors by designing an Autonomy
Monitoring Service (AMS). Chapter II will review previous research in this area of
autonomy monitoring. Chapter III explains the methodologies used in this research to
generate design the AMS and test data from SITL. In Chapter IV performance data is
examined and evaluated under various realistic scenarios. Finally, Chapter V provides a
summary of the design, the research conclusion and recommendations for future effort.

5

II. Literature Review
2.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter begin by familiarizing the reader with UAS utility and mishaps, as well
as, the root cause of the mishaps. Cyber-attack possibilities and prevention will be then be
discussed. This chapter will then review autonomy monitoring, human-machine teaming
and human-machine interface design to guide the baseline architecture framework of AMS.
Lastly, this chapter will explain two methods of tools and techniques such as statistical
process control (SPC) methods used to monitor a random process and Fault Injector
software system.
2.2 Small UAS
As mentioned in Chapter I, UAV is defined by the FAA as “one that is operated without
the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft” (Giese et al.,
2013). A related term is Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) which includes the aircraft
UAV as well as support elements like Ground Control Stations (GCSs), data links and
Launch and Recovery equipment. Today, UAS play an increasing role in many military
and civilian missions such as search and rescue, reconnaissance operations, real-time
surveillance, military training, weather monitoring, hazardous site inspection and range
extension, traffic monitoring, and agriculture. “Unmanned aircraft have been part of
aviation for years in varied applications and uses. The success of unmanned aircraft use in
military operations has fostered a desire to integrate unmanned systems, for general
purpose use, into missions covering flights in all controlled and uncontrolled airspace
domains”(Wargo et al., 2014)

6

Wargo (2014) stated that the growth of UAS in Department of Defense (DoD) is
increasing.
The majority of UAS operating in the national Airspace system (NAS) today
are predominantly operated by the Department of Defense (DoD). They were
not designed with NAS compatibility in mind but rather to meet military
mission needs. It is expected future commercial UAS will be designed and
operated much more along the lines of manned aircraft. (Wargo et al., 2014).

The economic value of the UAS technology industry is projected to be about $30 billion
per year supporting 300,000 American jobs by 2035. UAS represents a new and disruptive
technology challenging policy, procedures and technologies that exist today and have
served manned aircraft well for the last fifty-years or more. This UAS technology supports
an incredibly wide range of uses that not only allows old challenges to be addressed in new
ways but also creates new innovative world markets for hundreds of employees, if not
thousands, of new creative applications answering the call of “better, faster and cheaper”.
2.3 UAS Mishaps
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducted research about human factors
implications of unmanned aircraft accident (Williams, 2006). The research stated that
“unmanned aircraft (UA) have suffered a disproportionately large number of mishaps
relative to manned aircraft. In 1996, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB)
identified the human-system interface as the greatest deficiency in current UA designs”
(Williams, 2006).
FAA indicated that there are three flight-control categories that have been selected for
review regarding UAS mishaps. “The first category involves the use of an external pilot
(EP) to control the flight of the aircraft. The second category concerns the transfer of
7

control during flight. The third flight-control category is the automation of flight control”
(Williams, 2006). According to the FAA research, “automation problems occur because
not all circumstances can be predicted. The inability to anticipate all possible contingencies
leads to situations in which the system behaves as it was designed but not in a manner that
was expected” (Williams, 2006). FAA suggested two solutions to this problem; the first is
to design the system in a way that keeps the pilot more aware of what the aircraft is going
to do during the flight. The second solution to the automation problem is to design the
automation to be more flexible so that, even when a particular contingency has not been
anticipated, the system is still able to generate an appropriate response. This is a challenge
for those developing “intelligent” systems, and this field is still in its infancy (Williams,
2006).
Other research on mishap statistics as discussed by Giese et al. (2013) indicated that
there are many phases in interacting with UAVs in which errors can occur: set-up of
computers, monitoring the system, failure detection, and diagnosis and corrective action.
The demand for sustained attention and risk of fatigue during long periods of monitoring
present new Human Factor challenges. Awareness of cognitive psychology, dealing with
perception, information processing, thinking, memory, as well as emotions, is important in
the aviation context to ensure safe and efficient operation (Giese et al., 2013).
Giese et al.(2013) stated that U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) claims that human
error contributes to 20-70% of UAS mishaps in the military. The research that they did on
military UAV mishaps statistics, pointed out that “mishaps which occurred since 2004 and
only those involving aircraft classified as Remotely Piloted Aircraft were reviewed,
resulting in a total of 52 events. Consequently, the analysis included only MQ-1A and MQ9” (Giese et al., 2013). The data initially categorized to give brief understanding of the
8

percentage of mishaps with human factor involvement such as operator error. According
to their research of 52 mishaps events, 42% (22 of 52) mishaps studied involved human
error.
Figure 2 presented by Giese et al. (2013) shows that “operator error is by far the largest
issue, both as causal and contributing factors. Conversely, while the second largest main
cause is technical failure, the design of technology, interfaces as well as procedures and
guidance material are significant contributing factors. Maintenance plays a rather small
role” (Giese et al., 2013).

Figure 2. Breakdown of high-level mishap main causes (left)
and contributing factors (right) (Giese et al., 2013)

2.4 UAS Subject to Cyber Attack
The increasing ubiquity of computerized, automated systems has led to growing
interest in the development and application of methods for defending against cyberattacks.
The concern is that vulnerabilities may exist in unmanned autonomous systems that could
be easily exploited to compromise the effectiveness of the system (Carnahan & Heiges,
2015). It is very important to create a defense system for regarding countering malicious
attacks such as cyber-attack or any strange divergent behavior that can happen to the UAS
while flying a real mission.
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A group of researchers conducted a project on the system aware cyber security for
cyber-attack defense. The project was performed by the Georgia Tech Research Institute
(GTRI) and the University of Virginia. In the project. “a UAV system was selected as the
demonstration platform for showing the application of the cyber defense techniques that
they used” (Carnahan & Heiges, 2015).
One of the three types of cyber-attacks that they included in the project is the waypoint
attack. Steps has been identified to show waypoint attack scenarios to test the cyber-attack
defense system that they built. “The waypoint attack changes the waypoint locations in
the autopilot’s flight plan causing it to fly a different trajectory from the one intended by
the operator. To execute the attack, the tester sends a new list of waypoints via Ethernet to
a Raspberry Pi onboard the aircraft that connects to one of the autopilot’s serial
communication ports. The attack Pi pushes the new list of waypoints to the autopilot
through the autopilot message stream. Since the autopilot sends the updated waypoint list
to the operator’s station, the change would normally be readily apparent”(Carnahan &
Heiges, 2015). Figure 3 shows an example of a waypoint attack, where the UAV
commanded flight plan was one of two rectangular patterns aligned with the runway.

Figure 3. Waypoint locations Attack Flight Plans (Carnahan & Heiges, 2015)
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Heiges et al. (2015) concluded that “the tester’s interface was developed primarily to
allow the test director to monitor the aircraft’s true state while it is undergoing a cyberattack and its perceived state. The waypoint attack takes command of the UAV’s flight
plan while masking the attack on the operator’s ground control station. As a result of the
masking, the operator’s display shows the aircraft on the intended route while, in reality,
the aircraft’s flight path is being rerouted” (Carnahan & Heiges, 2015)
2.5 Autonomy Monitoring
This thesis focuses on autonomy monitoring which automatically detects and identifies
divergence behaviors. Autonomy monitoring can increase the rate of incident detection in
any process that needs to be monitored. Research by University of Florida (Davoudi et al.,
2018) showed that pervasive sensing technology and artificial intelligence (AI) can be used
for autonomous patient monitoring in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). They used wearable
sensors, light and sound sensors, and a camera to collect data on patients and their
environment. Figure 5 shows the intelligent ICU uses pervasive sensing for collecting data
on patients and their environment where the nurse is monitoring the autonomy monitoring
system through activity and pain level monitors that will display important information of
the patient. The system they built uses computer vision and deep learning techniques.

Figure 4. Intelligent ICU Users Pervasive Sensing (Davoudi et al., 2018)
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Research on UAV flight autonomy monitoring done by Pengbo et al. (2017) provides
studies on the key technologies and simulation of UAV flight monitoring. They gave an
example of Airbus; this airline is the most representative company in a lot of foreign
airlines around the world. The company began to develop real-time monitoring which
included a fault diagnosis of plane troubleshooting rules, flight logs, and support
information.
UAV flight monitoring is a set of intelligent software services that displays the current
UAV flight status and remote sensing data with intuitive chart and real time data. The
autonomy monitoring can determine whether the UAV flight is normal or abnormal by
comparing deviation between actual flight parameters and rated parameters.
The Pengbo et al., (2017) introduced two models of autonomy monitoring which were
state monitoring model and prediction model. Those two models are foundational for this
thesis. In their research, the function of the state monitoring module is to provide the
current state of the system from the received data extraction module. The system can
identify fault data in the scheduled telemetry parameters. The second model is the UAV
prediction model where the system could receive control instruction from GCS computer
and predict the future motions of the UAV.
The Pengbo et al.(2017) presented prediction models for aircraft location, engine
operation, and autopilot status. Figure 6 shows the prediction model where the controller
has the same control law as the flight control computer.
It can also skip the model directly and use the flight control computer to
produce control instruction if necessary. UAV six degrees of freedom model
established with the "gray-box" modeling method. Engine model uses the
parametric method of system identification. By neural network model
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learning the historical data, the model could get generalized dynamic model
of the cylinder temperature, engine speed (Pengbo et al., 2017)

Figure 5. UAV System Prediction model (Pengbo et al., 2017)

They concluded some advantages and features that indicate the major concepts of the
models, such as:
•

The system displays the current UAV flight status and remote sensing data with
intuitive chart and real time data. It could determine whether the UAV flight is
normal by comparing deviation between actual flight parameters and rated
parameters.

•

If there is an unexpected circumstance, the system will alarm in time and prompt
commander to give remote control instructions.

•

The internal storage flight parameters of system can be used to record replay and
to analyze the whole flight process.

•

The system can alarm to handler on the ground when necessary and reduce the risk
of accident.

UAV flight monitoring system can monitor UAV comprehensively and real-time. This
will improve the security, reliability, and efficiency of UAV flight. This feature has
important theoretical significance and application value for the growth of UAV in the
future.

13

2.6 Tools and Techniques
Statistical Process Control
One of the tools and techniques for autonomy monitoring is Statistical Process Control
(SPC). SPC is a method of quality control that uses statistical methods to monitor and
control a process to make sure it operates efficiently while working automatically. SPC is
a tool for measuring and controlling quality during any operation. “Walter Shewhart who
was the first to introduce the idea of process monitoring by regularly taking samples from
a production process and comparing the outcome of the measurement to appropriately
designed control limits”.(Panagiotidou et al., 2018). Now, many industries are using SPC
tools to monitor process behavior, and then discover production problems. “Statistical
Process Control (SPC) has been used for nearly a century in production processes for the
effective and fast identification of operation under undesirable conditions” (Panagiotidou
et al., 2018).
The most popular SPC tool is the control chart. The control chart is a graph of the data
with average and standard deviation (“sigma”) lines to determine process stability. “it is
often recommended to monitor the profiles using a separate control chart for each
parameter of a parametric model, provided the estimates of the parameters at each sampling
stage are independent”(Woodall et al., 2004). The average and sigma lines are calculated
from the data. The Upper Control Limit (UCL) and Lower Control Limit (LCL) represent
the +-3 standard deviations. Assuming the samples are independent and normally
distributed, 99.7% of the output data should fall between the UCL and LCL.
Oakland's book on statistical process control ( 2003) stated that SPC has three zones
and the action required depends on the zone in which the results fall in the chart. Figure 6
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shows the schematic control chart with the three zones; these are stable, warning and
action.

Figure 6. Schematic Control Chart (Oakland, 2003)

The possibilities are:
•

Carry on or do nothing (stable zone – common causes of variation only).

•

Be careful and seek more information, since the process may be showing
special causes of variation (warning zone).

•

Take action, investigate or, where appropriate, adjust the process (action zone
– special causes of variation present).

The chart consists of two types of variation that will help distinguish between stable
and action zone:

15

•

Common cause variation (intrinsic to the process and will always be present)

•

Special cause variation (indicates that the process is out of control)

Figure 7 shows an example of SPC on monthly sales data where there was average
sales increase after week 18. The observer’s task is to identify a special cause of variation
in monthly sales which shows shift in sales after week 18. This special cause of variation
gave us a prediction that it is possible to happen again and we can see that there was an
increase in average sales during week 25

Figure 7. Example of Monthly Sales Data (Oakland, 2003)

The use of SPC can help managers and process operators to ask useful questions about the
variation which leads to better process management and improvements in the future.
“These describe the extent of the variation that is being seen in the process due to all the
common causes, and indicate the presence of any special causes. If or when the special
causes have been identified, accounted for or eliminated, the control limits will allow the
managers

to

predict

the

future

performance

confidence.”(Oakland, 2003).
Fault Injector Tool
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of

the

process

with

some

Fault Injector is a software system developed by Jason Boubin who was a student at
the Airforce Institute of Technology (AFIT) in 2017. Fault Injector trigger failsafes in
fixed wing Ardupilot aircraft in SITL using Dronekit, Mavproxy, and Mavlink. Fault
Injector runs on python 2.7, using a GUI written with tkinter. It connects to SITL instance
using Dronekit. it can be easily modified to inject failures into craft that can be simulated
in SITL, or to change any variable in the vehicle or simulation over mavlink. Figure 8
illustrates an example of fault injector program. It shows a snapshot of the fault injector
during a flying mission.

Figure 8. Fault Injector by Jayson Boubin (2017)

The wind can be set in the simulation by providing fault injector with wind direction
and wind speed. Wind direction is in degrees from north in the direction the wind is
blowing. For example, a 0-degree wind direction will cause the wind to blow directly north.
A 20-degree wind direction will cause the wind to blow slightly to the right of north. SITL
allows for the simulation of GPS failure. To simulate GPS using SITL simulation variable,
a GPS fault button will be used. This will initiate a GPS failsafe, and should result in
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considerable drift of aircraft. The software program can emulate a battery failure by
changing the vehicle’s battery capacity failsafe value.
2.7 Human Machine Teaming (HMT)
With the growing complexity of environments in which systems are expected to
operate, adaptive Human Machine Teaming (HMT) has emerged as a key area of research
(Madni & Madni, 2018). Today, humans are surrounded by great technology. Humans can
play a big role of determining the effectiveness of a system in which they are teamed with
a machine or system. Shared goals, shared awareness, and trust toward team members,
human or artificial, can be factors in effective teamwork. Human and machine can
complete each other to accomplish successful mission with minimum risk.
Just as proper teaming between humans and machines, permit humans to have a greater
desired effect, the improper teaming can lead to effects with significant negative
consequences. That improper teaming, can lead to catastrophic accidents. For example, if
the operator is not able to maintain vigilance of system state during cyber-attack or system
failures mishap can occur. In most UASs, there are many parameters which need to be
monitor during a mission and human cannot be vigilante of every signal parameter in the
aircraft all the time. This issue is very important because many systems are designed with
the expectation that the operator will detect and correctly correct the aircraft during any
anomalous condition
Research at the University of Central Florida (Ad, 2017) about workload, situation
awareness, and teaming issues for UAV operations showed that complexity of UAV
systems, as well as mission demands on the operator, indicate that the problem of mental
workload deserves critical attention in the design of interfaces, displays, and how control
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stations are staffed. “The concept of workload can be defined as the combination of task
demands, or load factors, and an operator's response to those demands”(Ad, 2017). HMT
involving the teaming of an autonomous system and operator supervision discussed as one
means for decreasing operator workload and stress, permitting increased situation
awareness during real mission operations
There are several misperceptions that need to be dispelled before addressing humanmachine relations in this new light. The first misperception is that automation will replace
or offload humans, thereby making the human role less critical. The reality is that with
increasing automation, there is an increasing need for training because the automation
invariably does not replace the human; rather, it changes the role of the human from that
of an operator to that of a monitor/supervisor. For example, “with increasing automation
in an aircraft, the role of the human changed from flying the aircraft to managing the
automation (e.g., flight deck automation). Importantly, this automation needs to be highly
reliable (i.e., failure-proof). Otherwise, the human will have to step in to take over flying
the aircraft if the automation malfunctions” (Madni & Madni, 2018). That is why we still
need the human to be part of this relationship for monitoring the machine or system to
make sure that everything is functioning properly and if something is wrong, such as
system failure, the human will need to step in to take responsibility by controlling and
correcting the automation system. This section supports the concept that humans and
machines should be designed to complete each other by sharing responsibilities and duties
to make sure the final products provides acceptable levels of safety, reliability, and
functionality.
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2.8 Human Machine Interface (HMI)
For operators, the Human Machine Interface (HMI) represents the fundamental point
of interaction and the means of communicating knowledge between the system and the
individual. “HMI is critical for the effectiveness of human performance and the
maintenance of good situational awareness. It is also critical to determine what information
the operator needs during individual phases of each mission before considering how to
present such information” (Howitt & Richards, 2003). “The U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) claims that human error contributes to 20-70% of UAS mishaps in the military.
These figures vary greatly between platforms though. This suggests emphasis is needed on
designing Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs) which minimize the likelihood of human
error to occur, to increase UAV reliability and thus safety” (Giese et al., 2013).
Quigley et al.(2016) provides in-depth studies on semi-autonomous Human-UAV
Interfaces for Fixed-Wing Mini-UAVs. They provide general interface considerations
regarding Human-UAV interfaces.

Human-UAV interfaces must seriously consider

several factors that tend to be not as critical in ground-based human-robot interfaces:
•

The unstable dynamics of a mini-UAV require the interface to support a significant
level of autonomy for the UAV to be accessible to many users.

•

Many users have little to no experience flying air- planes, and can be confused and
disoriented by their many degrees of freedom.

•

If the user loses control of the UAV, it may quickly result in significant damage or
destruction of the UAV.

•

Since the UAV can fly considerable distances away from its operator, depending
on the accessibility and hostility of the environment, the UAV may not be
recoverable in the event of a crash.
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Quigley et al.(2016) stated that “interfaces are designed to clearly present the state of
the UAV, produce timely feedback, and provide a straightforward mapping between
interface controls and the resultant actions of the UAV”. “Systems that combine manual
control with automation to provide operators with supervisory management capabilities
appear to offer the best opportunity to reduce the deleterious effects of both high workload
and loss of vigilance” (Ad, 2017). The HMI requirements for UAVs used in combat roles
have been investigated over many years. Each trial has increased the level of complexity,
highlighted new HMI requirements and demonstrated the potential for combined
manned/unmanned operations in a variety of roles. (Howitt & Richards, 2003)
2.9 Preview
Concluding this chapter, the reader should have an understanding of multiple concepts
related to this research. UAS utility and mishaps during real operations. UAS mishaps
studied involved human error. Cyber-attack possibilities and prevention that needs to be
considered in this research. The ides of autonomy monitoring, Human-machine teaming
and human-machine interface to give clear understanding of the baseline architecture
framework of AMS.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Chapter Overview
Chapter III forms the foundation of methods used in this research and discusses the
development of the AMS algorithm. In the beginning of this chapter, objectives, metrics,
and data requirements are outlined describing how AMS will be created to meet the goals.
In this chapter, the main focus is the design of the algorithm, and testing simulation. First,
AMS design will be described with architecture diagrams to give readers an understanding
of the algorithm. Second, the test plan will be described through descriptions of the
treatments to be included in the simulation.
3.2 AMS Objectives, Metrics, & Data
The aim of this study was to design an Autonomy Monitoring Service (AMS) to notify
the Operator of divergent UAV behaviors. AMS will work autonomously in the GCS to
help the Operator detect divergent behaviors. The first stage of the design is to identify
AMS objectives, metrics, and required data sets to reflect the research objectives and
questions.
1. AMS Objectives
(a) Compare the real vehicle (i.e., Vehicle1) with digital representation of
the vehicle (i.e., Vehicle 2). It this thesis each vehicle will be simulated
in ArduPilot.
(b) Continuously monitor Vehicle 1 for abnormal behaviors such as flying
unplanned:
i.

Waypoints locations

ii.

Altitudes

iii.

Airspeeds
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(c) Continuously monitor vehicle 1 abnormal behaviors, aiding the operator
to anticipate fail safe states, such as:
i.

GPS disable

ii.

Battery fail

iii.

GeoFence engagement

(d) Adapt to changing statistics of the environment without giving false
notifications of divergent behaviors.
(e) Provide a Graphic User Interface (GUI) that supplements the existing
Ground Control Station (GCS).
(f) Displaying system output to the Operator in real time.
(g) Implementing a Statistical Process Control (SPC) tool to show control
charts for any special cause variation in the process of conducting the
mission.
2. Metrics
a. Average AMS divergence detection accuracy and false alarms of
divergent behaviors.
b. Average AMS synchronization time.
3. Required Data
a. Both vehicles position in 3D space.
b. SPC chart of the special cause variation in Waypoint location and
Altitude.
3.3 Design of the AMS
This section presents the architecture, including components and interfaces to aid the
reader’s understanding of the AMS design. AMS environment embodies a set of structured
principles to fulfill the objectives mentioned previously. The basic idea behind this design
is to compare state and behavior information between the real vehicle (Vehicle 1) and a
digital representation of this vehicle (Vehicle 2), notifying the operator of any special cause
variation in the process of Vehicle 1’s flight. This concept assumes that both the real
vehicle and the imaginary vehicle receive the same flight plans and therefore, should
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perform nearly identical flight patterns, this variation between the two aircraft is assumed
to be divergent behaviors of the real vehicle.

Figure 9. System Overview

Figure 9 illustrates a system overview of the mission. It shows the main operational
concepts of AMS and describes the interactions between the subject architecture and its
environment, and between the architecture and external systems. AMS will be designed to
support a Graphic User Interface (GUI) for the UAV Operator as a human-machine system
that will help detect abnormal behaviors and activities while flying UAV. AMS will be
continuously monitoring and notifying the UAV of abnormal behaviors while displaying
messages to the operator in real time through the GUI in the GCS. On the other side, an
attacker (Cyber-Attack) will change the path of Vehicle 1. In this research, the attacker will
be the Test Director that will implement attacks to Vehicle 1.
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Figure 10. AMS Physical Decomposition

Figure 10 illustrates a SysML block definition diagram of the AMS design that shows
the architecture of the system. AMS is consists of Algorithms code, a State Machine,
Dronekit, SPC graph, GUI, and SITL. On the right side, the operator is monitoring Vehicle
1 through Mission Planner software 1.3.57 on Windows. Vehicle 1 can be a Pixhawk 2 real
vehicle such as Sig Rascal 110 or can be another simulated vehicle in SITL 1. SITL 2 is
part of AMS that represents vehicle 2 (simulated vehicle). Ubuntu 16.04 operating system
is used to create and test Dronekit-Python codes without hardware.
The programing language of the AMS is Python 2.7 which provides the algorithms
including the design, analysis, and implementation. PyCharm on Windows was used for
algorithm development and analysis. Dronekit-Python contains the Python language
implementation of DroneKit that allows communication with vehicles over MAVLink. It
provides programmatic access to Vehicle 1 telemetry, state and parameter information, and
enables both mission management and direct control over vehicle movement and
operations (see Appendix A. for AMS Algorithms). As mentioned in Chapter II, SPC is a
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great quality tool for measuring and controlling processes during any autonomous
operation. A control chart will be presented in AMS to show special cause variation in the
process.

Figure 11. Test Environment Configuration

Figure 11 illustrates a SysML block definition diagram of the test environment
configuration of the whole system. In this system, the UAV will be a simulated vehicle
using SITL and it will be part of simulated environment. There are two crews, one of them
is the Operator that will monitoring AMS in GCS while the other one is the Test Director
who will be examining AMS functionality by using Fault Injector software system to inject
error into the vehicle, by passing the mission planning software.
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Figure 12. State Machine Diagram of AMS

AMS consists of a state machine that can change from one state to another in response
to some external input signal or event. Figure 11 illustrates a SysML state machine diagram
of the AMS design that shows five states. The system will initialize in the Starting Up state
and it will end with Pre-Terminating state. The following are the events, behaviors and
transition for each state:
1. Starting Up state:
(a) Show the time of the state execution.
(b) Start to save all data in dedicated excel sheet for every single mission and it will
keep saving data until terminating AMS in Pre-Terminating state.
(c) Connect to vehicle 1 and vehicle 2. If Vehicle 1 is simulated in SITL, the
connection type will be User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
(d) Synchronize Vehicle 1 Waypoints to Vehicle 2 on ground; clear the old mission
and upload the new mission to Vehicle 2 every 0.5 second. System will stop
looking for mission if Vehicle 1 is armed. If AMS is starting up again after
terminating and both vehicles are flying; AMS will synchronize the mission to
Vehicle 2 immediately.
(e) Synchronize all Vehicle 1 parameters to Vehicle 2 while both vehicles are on
ground.
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(f) Synchronize Vehicle 1 attributes (global location, altitude, battery, last
heartbeat, system status, mode, and armed). For example; if Vehicle 1 is in auto
mode, Vehicle 2 will be immediately on auto.
(g) Show all starting up procedures to operator in GUI.
(h) When both Vehicles are taking off, AMS will go to Monitoring state.
2. Monitoring state:
(a) Show time of the state execution.
(b) Extract wind values from Vehicle 1 to Vehicle 2, every 0.5 second to make sure
AMS is adapting environment regarding wind as measured by Vehicle 1.
(c) Monitor divergent behavior every 0.5 second:
i.

Waypoint location divergence between Vehicle 1 and Vehicle 2.

ii.

Altitude divergence between Vehicle 1 and Vehicle 2.

iii.

Show SPC charts for both behaviors in GUI to identify special cause
variation in the process.

(d) Monitor GPS disable for Vehicle 1. If this event happens, AMS will go to
Failsafe State.
(e) Monitor battery fail for vehicle 1. If this event happens, AMS will go to Failsafe
State.
(f) Monitor vehicle 1 heading with respect to Geo-Fence. If the vehicle is
approaching the Geo-Fence, AMS will notify the operator in GUI. If vehicle 1
is hitting the Geofence, AMS will go to Failsafe State.
(g) If mission has been accomplished and both vehicles have landed, AMS will go
to Pre-Terminating state.
3. Syncing state:
(a) Show time of the state execution.
(b) AMS will keep monitoring and showing SPC charts for divergent behaviors
every 0.5 second even if AMS is not in Monitoring state.
(c) Set Vehicle 2 mode to “GUIDED” instead of “AUTO” for Simple Go To
command rules.
(d) Command Vehicle 2 to travel towards a target by using Simple Go To
command.
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(e) Change the speed of the simulation for Vehicle 2 to a value of 3 (means 3x real
time). Increasing the simulation speed will allow Vehicle 2 to catch Vehicle 1.
(f) If the divergence is altitude, Vehicle 2 will grab the altitude information by
uploading the new mission of Vehicle 1.
(g) If the divergence is waypoint, Vehicle 2 will grab the waypoint information by
uploading the new mission of Vehicle 1.
(h) If the divergence is altitude and waypoint, Vehicle 2 will grab the information
by uploading the new mission of Vehicle 1.
(i) If the is no divergence:
i.

Calculate and show the correction time (from divergence to no
divergence).

ii.

AMS will changing the speed of the simulation for Vehicle 2 to a value
of 1 (a value of 1 means normal real clock time).

iii.

Set Vehicle 2 mode to “AUTO” instead of “GUIDED”

iv.

AMS will go to Monitoring state.

4. Failsafe state:
(a) Showing time of the state execution
(b) If Vehicle 1 is failsafe; GPS disable, Vehicle 2 will be placed into this failsafe
too.
(c) If Vehicle 1 is failsafe; Battery fail, Vehicle 2 will be placed into this failsafe
too.
(d) If Vehicle 1 is failsafe; GeoFence early warning, AMS will notify the Operator
that Vehicle 1 is reaching to the fence. Vehicle 2 will trigger the failsafe, if it
is triggered by Vehicle 1.
5. Pre-Terminating state
(a) Show time of the state execution.
(b) AMS will be terminating after 5 seconds.
(c) All the data of the mission will be in dedicated excel sheet for research and
analysis by the operator.
(d) 3D plot of the two vehicles will be
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AMS Thresholds
There are two different thresholds for each divergence. Table 1 shows the thresholds
that have been chosen by the researcher to study AMS. In the Monitoring state, 100 meters
horizontally will be the threshold before AMS determines divergence in location. At 100
meters, AMS will transition to Syncing state; then and it will look for a divergence of 60
meters be between the two vehicles. This insures that the distance between the two vehicles
is less than 60% to return to the Monitoring state. The same concept will be applied with
respect to altitude, where the vertical threshold to exit the Monitoring state is 15 meters
and the threshold to exit the Syncing State is 10 meters.
Table 1. AMS Thresholds

Index
1
2

Divergence
Location Distance Threshold [m]
Altitude Distance Threshold [m]

Monitoring State
100
15

Syncing State
60
10

Further on in this Chapter and Chapter IV, a survey with an AFIT safety pilot will be
introduced. This survey was conducted to determine the safety pilot opinion regarding the
divergence threshold distance as compared to the values chosen by the researcher.
AMS Output
There are two ways to get the output of the system while running. The first way is
Ubuntu Terminal which will provide the Operator output during the mission. Figure 12
illustrates an example of the AMS output in Ubuntu Terminal. It shows a snapshot of the
AMS during a flying mission. In this example, AMS is shifting from the Starting Up state
to Monitoring state after establishing connection, downloading the mission profile from
Vehicle 1, clearing and uploading mission to Vehicle 2, and finally taking off. In the
Monitoring state, AMS is showing wind direction that Vehicle 2 is adapting from Vehicle
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1. As soon as AMS is in the Monitoring state, the system will start calculating location and
altitude difference between both vehicles. AMS will show the output every 0.5 second in
Ubuntu terminal. All messages in Ubuntu terminal are outlined by different colors to
distinguish between them while the operator is monitoring AMS.

Figure 13. Ubuntu Terminal showing a snapshot of the AMS

The other way to monitor the output of the system is through a GUI. Figure 13
illustrates a Graphic User Interface (GUI) of the AMS. Using a GUI written with tkinter,
AMS displays objects that convey information of the divergence behaviors and failsafe
events. It represents actions that can be taken by the UAV operator. On the right side of
the GUI are two SPC control charts that represent distance and altitude statistics. The
control charts monitor a process variable over time and identifies both common cause
variation (normal behavior) and special cause variation (abnormal behavior). Information
such AMS state, time, duration, state transitions, and type of divergence behavior will be
shown on the left side of the GUI.
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Figure 14. AMS Graphic User Interface (GUI)

3.4 Testing Simulation
Several treatments will be given to Vehicle 1 to observe AMS reaction and
functionality toward divergent behaviors (Location, and Altitude), and failsafe conditions
(GPS disable, Battery fail, Geofence early warning). Some test scenarios will be a single
event during a single mission and some test scenarios will be multiple events in one
mission. Metrics and Measurements will be described in this section for every test. To
accomplish most of the tests, the Fault Injector software, that was mentioned in Chapter II,
will be used to inject wind speed, wind direction, and failsafe events into Vehicle 1. Note
that Fault Injector bypasses the normal operator user interface, permitting the test director
to change information on the aircraft without the operator’s knowledge, which might
simulate events such as cyber-attacks. The researcher for this study will act as both, the
Test Director and the AMS Operator. Multiple trials for the main test scenario were
executed to make sure that results are consistent and averaged across random events. In
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this research, a total of 39 trials have been observed subjecting the AMS baseline to three
types of test. Tests, scenarios, and trials are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Test, Scenarios, and Trials
Index

Test

Scenario

Trial

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Location Divergent

Applying Environment effect
Applying Attack
Applying Environment effect
Applying Attack
GPS disable
Battery fail
Geofence

9
9
9
9
1
1
1

Altitude Divergent

Triggering Failsafe

Total:

39

Figure 15. Initial Flight Plan of a Square Mile

Figure 15 illustrates the UAV flight operating area around San Francisco International
Airport (SFO) that was used for this evaluation and the flight plan of 1 square mile in front
of the runway. The idea of making a square shape in the flight plan is to test Vehicle 1 with
different cardinal directions. The vehicle will follow the path through Waypoints A, B, C,
and D, then repeat the pattern. This is the mission plan that will be used for Location
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divergence scenarios shown in Table 3, as well as Altitude divergence scenarios shown in
Table 4.
Table 3. Mission Plan 1
Waypoint

Latitude [deg]

Longitude [deg]

Altitude [m]

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

37.6112398
37.6113078
37.6112738
37.6256188
37.6256188
37.6113078
37.6112738

-122.3525047
-122.3528481
-122.3346519
-122.3346090
-122.3528910
-122.3528051
-122.3346734

100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Airspeed
[m/s]
22
22
22
22
22
22
22

Altitude
[m]
100
100
100
110
115
120
150
150
150
120
115
110
100
100

Airspeed
[m/s]
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22

Table 4. Mission Plan 2
Waypoint

Latitude [deg]

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

37.6112416
37.6112568
37.6112736
37.6256192
37.6256192
37.6112568
37.6112738
37.6256188
37.6256188
37.6112611
37.6112398
37.6256103
37.6256231
37.6112611

Longitude
[deg]
-122.3524992
-122.3528695
-122.3346432
-122.3346048
-122.352896
-122.3528695
-122.3346519
-122.334609
-122.3528963
-122.3528641
-122.334609
-122.3346037
-122.3528990
-122.3528641

Location Divergence: Applying Environmental effects
In this scenario, AMS will be tested under environmental effects, such as varying wind
speed and direction to observe AMS reaction and functionality resulting from this
environmental variable. The application of this scenario, will help in understanding the
statistics of the environmental impact on vehicle 1 and its effect on vehicle 2. Summary of
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the mission and the injected environment for each trial are shown in Table 5. Note the goal
of AMS is not to alert the Operator due to aircraft divergence which might occur due to
environmental effects. These effects are assumed to introduce noise into aircraft location,
which complicates the identification of true divergent behavior.
Table 5. Location Scenarios, Applying Environmental Effects
Trial

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Mode
Vehicle 1
Vehicle 2
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO

AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO

Environmental Effect for V1
Wind Speed
Wind direction
[m/s]
[deg]
0
0
5
0
5
90
5
180
5
270
10
0
10
90
10
180
10
270

Location Divergence: Applying Attack
In this scenario, AMS will be tested by implementing an attack that will cause
divergence in Vehicle 1’s location or waypoints with respect to the mission plan. The Test
Director will change the location of a waypoint by injecting a new mission plans through
the fault injector interface. The idea is to create another one square mile shape offset from
the initial flight path, but a half mile away from the user’s intended location. Figure 16
illustrates the new mission plan in red, as compared to the intended mission, depicted in
yellow. Since this is a simulated attack, Vehicle 2 still has the original flight plan.
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Figure 16. The New Flight Plan (in Red Color)
Table 6. Mission Plan 3
Index

Latitude
[deg]

Longitude [deg]

Altitude [m]

Airspeed
[m/s]

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

37.6112416
37.6042362
37.6041683
37.6186846
37.6186506
37.6041683
37.6112738

-122.3524992
-122.3438787
-122.3256826
-122.3255968
-122.3439217
-122.3438787
-122.3346734

100
100
100
100
100
100
100

22
22
22
22
22
22
22

The new mission plan is shown in Table 6. There will be no environmental effects
introduced while testing divergence in these scenarios. Summary for each trial are shown
in Table 7. Trials 10, 11, 12, and 13 are for a single event which occur in one mission,
where the Test Director will load the new mission plan in Table 4 when Vehicle 1 reaches
a certain point in the desired flight plan. This enables AMS to reaction be observed from
different angles. Trials 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 are for a multiple event in one mission where
the Test Director will shift between the two mission plans, at specific times in the pattern.
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The underlying goal for these tests was to observe AMS reaction to a varying waypoint, at
different approach distances to that waypoint.
Table 7. Location Scenarios, Applying Attack
Trial

Action Taken

When Reached

V1 Toward

Event

10

Vehicles
Mode
AUTO

Load New Mission plan

Initial A

One

11

AUTO

Load New Mission plan

Initial B

12

AUTO

Load New Mission plan

Initial C

13

AUTO

Load New Mission plan

Initial D

14

AUTO

Shifting Between Them

15

AUTO

Shifting Between Them

16

AUTO

Shifting Between Them

17

AUTO

Shifting Between Them

18

AUTO

Shifting Between Them

30s, 1min, 1min 30s,
2min, 2min 30s
30s, 1min, 1min 30s,
2min, 2min 30s
30s, 1min, 1min 30s,
2min, 2min 30s
30s, 1min, 1min 30s,
2min, 2min 30s
30s, 1min, 1min 30s,
2min, 2min 30s

Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint

One
One
One
Multiple
Multiple
Multiple
Multiple
Multiple

Altitude Divergence: Applying Environmental effects
In this scenario, AMS will be tested under environmental effects, such as wind speed
and direction to observe divergence in altitude and the AMS reaction in response to this
divergence. In applying this scenario, the statistics of the environment and its impact to
Vehicle 1 will be understood. The flight plan using the one square mile box pattern from
the previous scenarios will be used again here (Figure 14). Table 4 presents the mission
plan for this scenario. Summary of the mission and the conditions injected into the
environment for each trial are shown in Table 8.
Table 8. Altitude Scenarios, Applying Environmental Effects
Trial

Vehicles Mode

Environmental Effect for V1
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19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

1

2

AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO

AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO
AUTO

Wind Speed
[m/s]
0
5
5
5
5
10
10
10
10

Wind dir.
[deg]
0
0
90
180
270
0
90
180
270

Altitude Divergence: Applying Attack
In this scenario, AMS will be tested by causing altitude divergence in Vehicle 1. The
Test Director will change the flight plan by uploading waypoints with new altitudes. Figure
14 shows the one square mile flight profile used for this scenario, that was used in the
previous scenarios. Table 9 shows the altitude scenarios tested.
Table 9. Altitude Scenarios, Applying Attack
Trial

Action Taken

When Reached

V1 Toward

Event

28

Vehicles
Mode
AUTO

Altitude of 120 m

Initial C

One

29

AUTO

Altitude of 125 m

Initial C

30

AUTO

Altitude of 130 m

Initial C

31

AUTO

Altitude of 135 m

Initial C

32

AUTO

Altitude of 140 m

Initial C

33

AUTO

Altitude of 150 m

Initial C

34

AUTO

30s, 1min, 1min 30s

35

AUTO
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AUTO

Shifting Between
100m, 120m, 140m
Shifting Between
100m, 120m, 140m
Shifting Between
100m, 120m, 140m

Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint
Next New
Waypoint

30s, 1min, 1min 30s
30s, 1min, 1min 30s

Triggering Failsafe
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One
One
One
One
One
Multiple
Multiple
Multiple

Testing failsafe triggers, such as GPS disable, Battery fail, and GeoFence will be tested
in three trials. AMS will be tested triggering by injecting a failsafe event in Vehicle 1 using
the Fault Injector. For this section, straight forward scenarios will be implemented by
qualitatively observing AMS behavior specially by monitoring Vehicle 2 reaction to a
change in Vehicle 1’s state. The Mission plan from Table 3, used in previous scenarios,
will be used for three failsafe trials. The same one square mile flight profile from the
previous scenarios will again be used. The Test Director will implement the failsafe after
Vehicle 1 end a complete cycle of the pattern.
Safety Pilot Survey
It is an important to get appropriate limitations regarding threshold distance for
divergence in practice. Mr. Rick Patton, from the AFIT Autonomous and Navigation
Technology (ANT) Center, an expert safety pilot that will provide the needed input to this
research. These questions were provided in an email request. The answers will be shown
in Chapter IV.
The questions were:
1- How many meters can a UAV shift in Location (Horizontally) from the original
plan before you consider “something is wrong with the UAV?
2- How many meters can a UAV shift in Altitude from the original plan before
you consider “something is wrong with the UAV”?
3- How many seconds can a small UAV be divergent from the original plan, such
that you still consider “it normal”?
4- For a reasonably windy day, how many more meters can a UAV shift that you
will still consider it "normal”?
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3.5 Preview
In summary, this chapter outlined the development of AMS algorithm, objectives,
metrics, and required data to give a clear idea of the design that will meet the research
objectives and questions in Chapter I. In this research, the design of the AMS and testing
simulation were introduced to the reader. The results of simulation tests will be shown in
Chapter IV.
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IV. Analysis and Results
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the results of the test methods described in Chapter III. A variety
of data collected and findings gathered from the simulations test scenarios provide clear
results on utility and performance of the AMS. As a result, the analysis will be largely
quantitative with some qualitative observations to answer research questions in Chapter I.
4.2 Simulation Results
Observations of AMS were examined and evaluated under various realistic scenarios
in mission planner. After running 39 experimental trials in SITL, a summary of the results
are presented, including average AMS detection accuracy and false alarms of divergent
behaviors, average of AMS synchronization time, both vehicles position in 3D space, and
SPC chart of the special cause variation in Waypoint location and Altitude. Also, the results
from the Safety Pilot survey are presented in this section. Appendix B. has all the results
documented for the 39 trials (including 115 divergent events).
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics for every scenario shown in Tables 10, 11,12, and 13 will
include the weighted mean, weighted standard deviation, and the range of the results for
Mission duration, UCL, Mean, and LCL.
Table 10. Summary Statistics of Location, Applying Environmental Effects

Statistic
Weighted Mean
Weighted StdDev.
Max
Min

9 Trials (9 Detection Events)
Mission Duration
[min]
UCL
10.7
30.1
1.9
22.5
15.2
74.1
9.0
2.4
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SPC
Mean
18.5
16.6
52.4
0.4

LCL
7.4
10.5
30.7
0.0

Statistic
Range

9 Trials (9 Detection Events)
Mission Duration
[min]
UCL
6.2
71.7

SPC
Mean
52.0

LCL
30.7

Table 11. Summary Statistics of Location, Applying Attack

Statistic
Weighted Mean
Weighted StdDev.
Max
Min
Range

9 Trials (49 Detection Events)
Mission
synchronization
Duration [min]
time [s]
9.9
6.7
1.7
3.2
13.1
13.3
8.1
2.3
4.9
11.0

UCL
58.5
27.8
90.1
35.0
55.1

SPC
Mean
40.5
21.1
65.8
21.2
44.6

LCL
22.5
14.6
41.0
7.4
33.6

Table 12. Summary Statistics of Altitude, Applying Environmental Effects

Statistic
Weighted Mean
Weighted StdDev.
Max
Min
Range

9 Trials (11 Detection Events)
Mission
synchronization
Duration [min]
time [s]
15.8
3.9
6.7
2.5
30.1
6.8
5.6
2.4
24.5
4.4

UCL
38.8
32.4
137.6
13.2
124.4

SPC
Mean
25.0
26.5
106
5.9
100.7

LCL
11.3
20.5
75.7
1.3
16.5

Table 13. Summary Statistics of Altitude, Applying Attack

Statistic
Weighted Mean
Weighted StdDev.
Max
Min
Range

9 Trials (46 Detection Events)
Mission
synchronization
Duration [min]
time [s]
9.2
5.5
1.2
3.4
12.1
17.9
8.2
2.0
3.9
15.9

UCL
51.9
12.8
73.2
26.3
47.0

SPC
Mean
34.5
10.0
51.7
14.8
36.9

LCL
17.1
7.3
30.1
3.2
26.9

The weighted mean in Table 10 is 18.5 meters across 9 trials in varying wind. Also, the
weighted standard deviation for UCL is 22.5 meters in the same environment. The lowest
42

weighted standard deviation is in Table 13, which is 10.0 meters for altitude divergence
while applying an attack. The highest weighted standard deviation in Table 12 is 26.5
meters for altitude divergence while also applying environmental effects. The
synchronization time of Table 13 is the shortest for this research where the minimum
syncing time while applying an attack was 2.0 seconds. The weighted standard deviation
for the mean location distance was 21.1 meters. The weighted mean of AMS
synchronization time was 4.02 seconds. These values indicate very good AMS
performance across the range of scenarios.
In Table 11, which shows the results for a Waypoints Location attack, the maximum
synchronization time is 17.9 seconds, which is higher than any other condition. The reasons
for this extended time is due to the multiple syncing that occurs for some events. This
situation adds more time to the total synchronization time. To account for this behavior,
the concept of stability of Syncing State is introduced in this section. As mentioned
previously in this Chapter, one of the interesting observations was Syncing state behaviors.
The results showed that sometimes the Syncing State was not “stable”, where Vehicle 2
performed multiple times to regain alignment with Vehicle 1 instead of undergoing a single
synchronization as expected. Figure 17, illustrates an example of multiple sync in one
mission.
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Figure 17. Trial 31, Multiple Sync

This behavior is not harming the main goal of AMS which is monitoring and detecting
because AMS eventually return to the Monitoring State in the end even when multiple
synchronization are required. A lot of rules and logic drive this behavior. Suggestions and
recommendations about this situation will be introduced in Chapter V. Figure 18 illustrates
the percentage of Stability in Syncing state for location and altitude.
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Figure 18. Percentage of Stability for Location and Altitude

The percentage of the Syncing State stability (i.e., the percentage of trials in which the
position of the two vehicles were aligned after entering the Syncing State a single time) is
shown in Figure 16. For location divergence with attack, the aircraft synchronization was
stable in 56% of the trials where the percentage of stable synchronization for altitude
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divergence with environmental effects is 100%. When applying an attack on altitude, the
percentage of stable synchronization was 44%.

Figure 19. Percentage of Stability for all Trials (115 Detection Events)

As mentioned before, this behavior is not harming the main goal of AMS which is
monitoring and detecting because both kinds of syncing will be stabilizing after a few
events. However, if an operator is warned of all divergence detections, they might find this
alert to present a nuisance. Figure 18 illustrates the stability of synchronization for 115
detection events in this research. A single sync is sufficient in 55% of the total
synchronization events. This indicates that AMS is more doing single sync than multiple
sync while operating.
All the 115 events were detected by AMS where there is no detection if there is no
divergent. They didn’t miss any divergent in all trials. some of the events was detected but
there was no attack implemented by the Test Director. This situation happened in altitude
divergent when we apply environment effect.
The qualitative analysis of testing Failsafe warning was conducted after observing three
trials for three 3 Failsafes. The Test Director injected failsafe events to Vehicle 1 using the
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Fault Injector software system. AMS reacted to monitoring GPS disable, battery fail, and
Geofence heading by copying the state of the vehicle and passing it to Vehicle 1. AMS
went to Failsafe state by commanding Vehicle 2 to exactly what Vehicle 1 is doing during
the mission. If the failsafe will let Vehicle 1 do RTL, then Vehicle 2 will do the same. AMS
was constructed to make monitoring and triggering parameters an easy task.
Table 14. Summary of Triggering Failsafe
State
Failsafe Type
Scenario Type
Number of Event
Mission Duration [min]
Triggering Failsafe
Message warning
Keep monitoring for

Trial 37
GPS disable
Applying Attack
1
8.5
Yes
Yes
Enable GPS

Trial 38
battery fail
Applying Attack
1
8.2
Yes
Yes
Deactivate battery

Trial 39
Geofence heading
Applying Attack
1
10.1
Yes
Yes
Geofence heading

From the observation of the system, AMS is monitoring failsafe disable. When the Test
Director is enabling or deactivating failsafe event, the AMS is copying again the state of
vehicle and passing it to Vehicle 2. The AMS is monitoring failsafe trigger every 0.5
seconds. It is very important for the model to monitor those events to increase situation
awareness during the mission. This what the Operator needs to minimize risk on the job.
Safety Pilot Survey
The survey was conducted via email. The Safety Pilot provided answers to the questions
mentioned in Chapter III. These values for acceptable divergence of distance and time will
help understand the difference between this research threshold and the Safety Pilot
threshold. More explanation and comparison will be discussed in Chapter V.
The Safety Pilot answers are:
1-

How many meters can a UAV shift in Location (Horizontally) from the original plan
before you consider “something is wrong with the UAV?
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Answer: 20 Meters
2-

How many meters can a UAV shift in Altitude from the original plan before you
consider “something is wrong with the UAV”?
Answer: Between 5 to 10 Meters

3-

How many seconds can a small UAV be divergent from the original plan, such that
you still consider “it normal”?
Answer: Between 5 to10 Seconds

4-

For a reasonably windy day, how many more meters can a UAV shift that you will
still consider it "normal”?
Answer: The above values would apply in windy condition with a 10% tolerance factor

Location Divergence: Applied Environmental effects
For all nine trials representing different scenarios of environmental wind effects due to
wind speed and wind direction, AMS adapts Vehicle 2 with the statistics of the Vehicle 1
environment without giving a false notification of divergent behaviors. There was no
divergence detected by AMS due to the applied environment conditions.
Trial 3
Trial 3 involves AMS adapting to changing environmental statistics without giving a
false notification of divergent behavior. Figure 19 illustrates Vehicle 2 flying the same
mission as Vehicle 1 while AMS is in the Monitoring State. Vehicle 2 is crabbing into the
east wind blowing where the wind speed is 5 m/s and the wind direction is 90 degrees (from
the East). In this example, Vehicle 1 is facing a little into the wind to overcome the wind,
which is being sensed by and relayed from Vehicle 1.
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Figure 20. Trial 3, Snapshot of Vehicle 2 flying in Mission planner

W

E

Wind Direction
End

Start

Figure 21. Trial 3, 3D flight path

Figure 18 illustrates the 3D path of the two vehicles. The path of both vehicles appear
identical to each other where it is hard for the observer to identify the red color line that
represents Vehicle 1. The blue color line represents Vehicle 2 and is drawn after the red
color line represents Vehicle 1. Both vehicles are close to each other flying the mission
plan. The results of this mission is shown in Table 15 and Figure 21.
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Table 15. Results of Trial 3
Index
1
2
3
4
5
7

Scenario Type
Wind Speed [m/s]
Wind Direction [deg.]
Mission Duration [min]
Divergent
Location Distance [m],
SPC analysis

Trial 3
Applying Environmental Effects
5
90
9.39
No
UCL
17.02
Mean
8.4
LCL
0.0

Figure 22. Trial 3, Statistical Process Control (C-Chart)

Trial 3 show what was expected after observing the 3D path of the two vehicles as they
fly very close to each other. The mean distance between vehicles is small, 8.4 meters, which
indicates little special cause variation in the process. The UCL was 17.02 meters as the
highest limit calculated by SPC during this mission.
Location Divergence: Applied Attack
Trial 10 to 18 examine AMS’s reaction to divergent behaviors. As mentioned
previously in Chapter III, there are two types of test, half of them implement single events
and the other half implement more than one event (multiple events). Based on the
observations from those trials, AMS detected all the divergent events.
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Trial 10
Trial 10 is an example of AMS detecting a single divergent behavior during an attack
on Vehicle 1. The Test Director changed the location of the waypoint by implementing a
new mission plan provided in Table 6. Figure 23 illustrates the attack on Vehicle 1. The
snapshot on the left represent the first moment of the attack, where the pink color path
showed the initial mission plan. The snapshot on the right represents Vehicle 1 flying
toward the new mission plan caused by the attack.

Figure 23. Trial 10, Snapshot of V1 starting to diverge to the new Waypoints
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Figure 24. Trial 10, 3D flight path

Figure 24 illustrates the 3D path of the two vehicles. For most of the path, the location
of both vehicles appears nearly identical until the Test Director applied an attack. When
the attack occurred, Vehicle 1 shifted its heading to the new mission plan. Vehicle 2 was
flying the path represented by the waypoints established by user within mission planner
and the divergence distance in aircraft was detected by the AMS. The location divergence
distance became greater than 100 meters. Immediately, AMS transitioned to the Syncing
state, assuming that the operator accepted the new flight path and requested the AMS to
synchronize Vehicle 2 location with Vehicle 1 location. As a result, Vehicle 2 traveled
towards the new target. Speeding the simulation by 3X real time permits Vehicle 2 to reach
the Syncing state threshold in distance which is 60 meters. When the divergence was
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reduces to this value, AMS transitions the Monitoring state. The results of the mission are
shown in Table 16 and Figure 25.
Table 16. Results of Trial 10
Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Trial 10
Scenario Type
Number of Event
Mission Duration [min]
Divergent
AMS Detect
Synchronization time [s]
Location Distance [m],
SPC analysis

UCL
Mean
LCL

Applying Attack
1
13.1
Yes
Yes
4.5
44.06
28.15
12.23

Figure 25. Trial 10, Statistical Process Control (C-Chart)

The results of Trial 10 show that AMS detected the divergence when the threshold in
the Monitoring state was reached. The special cause variation in the SPC chart that indicate
the divergence where the UCL was 44.06 meters and the LCL was 12.23 meters and the
mean of the location distance was 28.15 meters.
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Trial 15
An example of multiple events in one mission is present during Trial 15. The Test
Director implemented multiple attacks on Vehicle 1 to see the reaction of AMS under these
conditions. Figure 26 illustrates the 3D path of the two vehicles. There are four attacks
implemented by the Test Director. AMS was reacting fast for every event. This test was a
good example of how AMS react to multiple attacks within a single mission. The results
of the mission is shown in Table 17 and Figure 27.

Figure 26. Trial 15, 3D flight path
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Table 17. Results of Trial 15
Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Trial 15
Scenario Type
Number of Event
Mission Duration [min]
Divergent
AMS Detect
Synchronization time [s]
Location Distance [m],
SPC analysis

UCL
Mean
LCL

Applying Attack
4
10.2
Yes
Yes
7.7 – 11.5 – 6.2 – 10.5
72.92
51.41
29.90

Figure 27. Trial 15, Statistical Process Control (C-Chart)

The results of Trial 15 shows that AMS properly detected divergence in location when
the threshold in the Monitoring state was obtained. There are four waves of special cause
variation in the SPC chart shown in Figure 27, indicating the multiple divergent events.
The UCL is 72.92 meters and the LCL is 29.90 meters and the mean of the location distance
is 51.41 meters. These results are considered to be very good response across four events.
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Altitude Divergence: Applied Environmental effects
The next nine trials represent different scenarios for applying environmental effects of
wind speed and direction. AMS adapts properly to the estimated environment in 7 of the 9
trials. Two of the trials illustrated enough variation in altitude between Vehicle 1 and
Vehicle 2 that algorithm detected the variation as a divergent behavior. Each of these events
occurred while implementing environmental effects during takeoff. After takeoff, AMS
aligns the two vehicles on the mission plan. From the observations, AMS updates the wind
estimate for Vehicle 2 every 0.5 second and the results showed good performance.
Trial 21
Trial 21 is an example of AMS adapting to the changing statistics of the environment
without giving a false notification of divergence. Figure 28 and 29 illustrates Vehicle 2
flying the same mission of Vehicle 1 where AMS is in the Monitoring state. Vehicle 2
climbs while the wind is blowing from the down to the up (90 degrees) and the wind speed
is 5 m/s. In this trial, Vehicle 2 performs a very similar maneuver to Vehicle 1, gaining
altitude to the next waypoint, through consistently with a positive bias over vehicle 1.

Figure 28. Snapshot of Vehicle 2 climbing until 1070 meters
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Figure 29. Trial 21, 3D flight path
Table 18. Results of Trial 21
Index
1
2
3
4
5
7

Scenario Type
Wind Speed [m/s]
Wind Direction [deg.]
Mission Duration [min]
Divergent
Altitude Distance [m],
SPC analysis

Trial 21
Applying Environmental Effect
5
90
30.15
No
UCL
14.30
Mean
7.87
LCL
0.00

Trial 21 shows Vehicle 2 and AMS performing as expected shown in the 3D path of
the two vehicles, during which they climb in way that there is a small variation in altitude
between them. From Table 18, the mean variation of 7.87 is not considered significant in
this environment with wind speed of 5 m/s blowing from down to up. The UCL is 14.5
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meters as the highest limit calculated by the SPC chart during this simulated windy mission.
The UCL value was very close to the threshold.
Altitude Divergence: Applied Attack
Results of Trials 28 to 36 demonstrate AMS reaction to an altitude attack that was
implemented by the Test Director. As mentioned previously in Chapter III, there are two
types of test where half of them implement a single event per missions and the other half
implement more than one event (multiple events). From the observation of those trials,
AMS detected all the divergent events appropriately. Trial 30 is selected to show a single
divergent behavior.
Trial 30
Trial 30 is an example of AMS detecting a single divergent behavior during an attack
on Vehicle 1. The Test Director changed the altitude of Vehicle 1 to 150 meters after a
certain point. Figure 30 and 31 illustrates the attack on Vehicle 1 and how AMS handled
the resulting altitude increase, as commanded by the Test Director.

Figure 30. Snapshot of Vehicle 2 climbing until 150 meters

58

Figure 31. Trial 30, 3D flight path
Table 19. Results of Trial 30
Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Trial 30
Scenario Type
Number of Event
Mission Duration [min]
Divergent
AMS Detect
Synchronization time [s]
Altitude Distance [m],
SPC analysis

UCL
Mean
LCL
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Applying Attack
1
8.08
Yes
Yes
2.4
8.20
3.00
0.00

Figure 32. Trial 30, Statistical Process Control (C-Chart)

The results of Trial 30 shows that AMS detected the divergence in altitude when the
threshold for the Monitoring state was reach. The special cause variation in the SPC chart
indicate the divergence where the UCL is 8.2 meters and the mean of the altitude distance
is 3.0 meters. The synchronization time is 2.4 seconds, which is the second fastest
synchronization time in this research. AMS is fast and functioning as expected for
monitoring, detecting, and syncing.
4.3 Preview
In this chapter, performance of the developed AMS model was examined by several
measures, response time of the model with different scenarios were evaluated. This chapter
was dedicated to presenting largely quantitative with some qualitative observations.
Chapter V will provide concluding remarks, answers to the investigative questions from
Chapter I, and recommendation for future research.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter presents a summary of the work accomplished during this research.
Investigative questions from Chapter I are answered, and the conclusion of this research
along with recommendations for future work are described.
5.2 Conclusion of Research
The main objective of this research was to design and test an Autonomy Monitoring
Service (AMS) which is capable of notifying the Operator of divergent UAV behaviors. In
concluding, the overarching goal of providing and verifying AMS functionality was met.
The objectives in Chapter I and the AMS objective in Chapter III guided the course of this
research. AMS supports the concept that humans and machines should be designed to
complement each other by sharing responsibilities and behaviors effectively, making final
system safer and more reliable. This also supports the autonomy monitoring perspective,
which can increase the rate of incident detection in any process that needs to be monitored.
AMS consist of 859 lines of codes written in Python 2.7 to provide the algorithms
within the AMS state machine. The output information of AMS are displayed in Ubuntu
Terminal and GUI to be observed by the Operator. Those outputs display objects that
convey information of any divergent behaviors, change of AMS state and differences
between Vehicle 1 and the AMS simulated Vehicle 2.
Scenarios and trials were conducted to quantify AMS performance. These results
provide a baseline for future development and recommended improvements to the system.
After testing 115 divergent events in 39 trials, AMS generally performed the tasks as
envisioned. AMS detected all the attacks that was implemented by the Test Director with
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100% rate of divergence detection out of 95 divergent events occurred. The weighted mean
of AMS synchronization time was 4.02 seconds. These values indicate very good AMS
performance across the range of scenarios.
From the observations, AMS updates the wind estimate for Vehicle 2 every 0.5 second
and the results showed good performance of capturing the environmental effects. There are
only two cases out of the 18 trials from the applied environmental effects, where the Test
Director did not implement an attack on Vehicle 1, but AMS showed false alarms. The two
cases are Trial 22 and 25, where the Operator observed a divergence occurred immediately
after takeoff. It is hypothesized that Vehicle 2 did not have an accurate wind estimate. After
a few seconds of divergence, Vehicle 2 was synchronized flying with Vehicle 1.
As mentioned previously, there are two different thresholds that have been chosen by
the researcher for AMS. Also, there are the Safety Pilot thresholds inputs on his opinion of
distance and time regarding divergence suspicion. Table 20 shows the difference between
the AMS thresholds and Safety Pilot thresholds.
Table 20. Thresholds from AMS and Safety Pilot
Threshold

Location [m]
(Horizontal)
Altitude [m]
(Vertical)

AMS
In the
In the
Monitoring state Syncing state
100
60
15

10

AFIT
Safety Pilot
20
10

From the results of all 115 divergent events, the minimum UCL was 30.1 meters, where
the maximum UCL was 58.5 meters. The weighted UCL mean for all trails is 44.8 meters.
For the location distance, it is better to modify the AMS threshold with a new value that is
close to 44.8 meters. The Safety Pilot threshold which is 20 meters is not recommended
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because the lowest UCL was 30.1 meters. It appears the threshold chosen by the researcher
of 100 meters may be too high, too liberal. A value such as 50-60 meters would be a
reasonable compromise between environment variation and Safety Pilot conservative
opinion. For the altitude distance, the threshold chosen by the researcher is reasonable
threshold value because the minimum UCL is 12.8 meters which is higher than the value
that was provided by the Safety Pilot. Keeping the threshold at 15 meters for the altitude
distance is recommended.
5.3 Investigative Questions Answered
1- What is an architecture of an AMS?
The architecture of AMS consist of coded Algorithms, a State Machine, Dronekit,
Statistical Process Control (SPC) graph, Graphical User Interface (GUI), and Software in
the Loop (SITL). The core structure of the AMS architecture is described by the State
Machine, which can change from one state to another in response to some external input
signal or event. The State Machine imposes a structure to automatically change the
implementation (AMS behavior). The changing state-based methods are derived from the
main design concept to compare mode, location, speed and mission parameters between
the real vehicle (Vehicle 1) and a digital representation of this vehicle (Vehicle 2). The
design was built on this concept of comparison within statistical process variation. Creating
an imaginary vehicle in SITL flying and doing exactly what the Operator intended and that
the real vehicle should be doing in the air is the presumed method to catch divergent or
abnormal behaviors. In this research, a simulated environment was applied around AMS
to provide representative stochastic behavior.
2- What are the algorithms of the system for implementing AMS?
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The algorithms include a collection of functions especially designed to be used on range
of elements. Functions such as logic and thresholds. The programing language is Python
2.7 which provides the algorithms including the design, analysis, and implementation (See
Appendix A. AMS Algorithm). PyCharm on Windows was used for algorithm
development and analysis. Dronekit-Python contains the python language implementation
of DroneKit that allows communication with vehicles over MAVLink. It provides
programmatic access to Vehicle 1 telemetry, state and parameter information, and enables
both mission management and direct control over vehicle movement and operations.
3- How will AMS be presented to the Operator during the mission?
AMS can be presented by two ways to the Operator. One of the ways is Ubuntu
Terminal where the output of AMS will be shown in steps and information to read by the
Operator. All messages in SITL are outlined by different colors to distinguish between
them while the operator is monitoring AMS. The second way is a GUI that is part of the
AMS Architecture. It is written with tkinter, displays objects that convey information of
the divergent behaviors. It represents information and SPC control charts that shows
location and altitude distance live.
4- How does AMS robustly use statistics of the environment and the UAV dynamics?
AMS can adapt to the changing statistics of the environment under certain rules and
regulation of wind speed and direction. From the results analysis in Chapter IV, AMS
adapts to the changing statistics of the environment if the speed wind is less than or equal
to10 m/s. Applying greater speed wind such as 15 m/s will disable the capability of AMS
to reach target (Vehicle 1) when using the currently simulated vehicles. In this situation,
Vehicle 2 will perform a synchronization multiple times to regain alignment with Vehicle
1 instead of undergoing a single synchronization as expected. AMS will be in the Syncing
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state, giving a false alarm to the Operator, where the divergence is only environmental. A
lot of rules and logic drive this behavior. Suggestions and recommendations about this
situation will be introduced in recommendations for future research.
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research
AMS 1.0 is the baseline design for future research. The current design facilitates future
research regarding autonomy monitoring of UAVs. Working on this area will improve the
security, reliability, and efficiency of UAV missions. Autonomy monitoring has important
theoretical significance and application value for the growth of UAV. There are many
features could be added to future AMS architecture design.
Recommendations for future research including the following seven ideas:
1-

Future testing should include incorporating the autonomy monitoring system in real
flight (i.e., 110 Sig Rascal). Real results with a real environment can bring more accurate
results to the analysis, especially when the system is dealing with a dynamic
environment. This research was using SITL simulation to test this concept for a fixed
wing plane. The decision of choosing a fixed wing plane instead of rotorcraft is to have
more realistic results even when the results will have a lot of variation and deviation
because fixed wing plane is very close to realty, where most of real military UAVs are
fixed wing planes. The simulation used in this thesis supports higher fidelity models for
fixed wing aircraft than rotorcraft.

2-

Introducing more rules, more states, environmental effects, and errors injection by
are great to modify the system.

3-

Exploring the effects of other autopilot tuning parameters on AMS. There are many
parameters and attributes to be included in the Monitoring state. Adding more vehicle
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attributes and parameter information to the system will make the system smarter. Future
AMS can observe any of the vehicle attributes and monitor for change. Same thing with
parameters, where AMS can get, set, list, and observe parameters change during the
mission.
4-

A dynamic threshold that is able to adapt to changing statistics using Statistical
Process Control (SPC) as a part of AMS state machine. This can solve problems
regarding AMS capability of adapting to dynamic environments without notifying false
alarm to the Operator. For a windy day with speed wind of 20 m/s, AMS needs to be
capable of dynamically adapting to the environment effects. This will shift the system
from updating the wind to a dynamic threshold using machine learning. Having a
dynamic UCL and LCL in AMS, calculating the best threshold limit will likely avoid
false notifications under high wind condition.

5-

Loss Communication with a flying UAV is a dangerous situation that can leads to
loss of the UAV.

AMS can also be improved through the addition of a Loss

Communication state. This state will ideally monitor and look for any signal such as the
heartbeat of the vehicle. It will be entered immediately when last heartbeat found by the
AMS. Then a connection will be established again between the UAV and AMS. Figure
33 illustrate the future AMS state machine including Communication state.

66

Figure 33. State Machine Including Loss Communication State in the AMS Model

6-

As mentioned previously in Chapter IV, the results showed that sometimes the
Syncing State was not “stable”, where Vehicle 2 performed multiple times to regain
alignment with Vehicle 1 instead of undergoing a single synchronization as expected.
One of the ideas to eliminate multiple syncing in the AMS system is to make Vehicle 2
reach the tail of Vehicle 1. flying to a certain waypoint in the back of Vehicle 1 will
make Vehicle 2 makes the best alignment. Coming from behind with decreasing the
speed of simulation may help to eliminate the issue of multiple sync. Calculating the
heading of Vehicle 1 and catching the tail of Vehicle 1 is expected to significantly
modify the effectiveness of the Syncing state.

7-

In this research, AMS transitioned to the Syncing state, assuming that the operator
accepted the new flight path and requested the AMS to synchronize Vehicle 2 location
with Vehicle 1 location. A future modification could allow AMS to involve the Operator
decision when there is critical situation. The Human response input is very important to
include in the system. For example, if there is divergence in Vehicle 1, The AMS will
ask the Operator if he would like the system to procced with syncing procedure or wait
for more observation. The Operator may response in different way for every different
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situation. Those things are important for sharing the decisions with the machine. Human
Machine Teaming (HMT) is what is needed to modify AMS for future researchers.
Figure 34 illustrate the future AMS state machine including the human input connection
between the Operator and GUI.

Figure 34. Future AMS Physical Decomposition
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Appendix A. AMS Algorithms
#!/usr/bin/python
# from dronekit_sitl import SITL
# Import DroneKit-Python
from dronekit import connect, VehicleMode, CommandSequence, LocationGlobalRelative
from transitions import Machine
from tkinter import *
import tkinter as tk
from tkinter import ttk
from tkinter.messagebox import showinfo
from Tkinter import Tk, Checkbutton, Label
from Tkinter import StringVar, IntVar
from subprocess import Popen, PIPE
from colorama import init
from termcolor import colored
import time, sys, struct, os, math, csv, random, tkFileDialog, pdb, subprocess
from datetime import datetime
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import multiprocessing
from matplotlib import style
from matplotlib import pyplot
from matplotlib import pyplot as plt
import matplotlib.animation as animation
from matplotlib.animation import FuncAnimation
from matplotlib.pyplot import figure
from matplotlib.backends.backend_tkagg import FigureCanvasTkAgg
from random import randrange
import numpy as np
from numpy import log as ln
import scipy.linalg as la
from multiprocessing import Process, Pipe, Value, Array
import openpyxl
from mpl_toolkits import mplot3d
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import _thread
try:
import _thread
except ImportError:
import _thread as thread

class AutonomyMonitoringService():
def __init__(self):
# Define States
states = ['Starting Up', 'Monitoring', 'Syncing', 'Losing COMM.', 'FailSafe', 'Pre-Terminating']
# Initialize the state machine
self.machine = Machine(states=states, initial='Starting Up')
"""Initialize AMS variables"""
self.diverging_location = None
# location
self.diverging_altitude = None
# altitude
self.Vehicle1 = None
# Vehicle1
self.Vehicle2 = None
# Vehicle2
self.north_divergence = None
# North location
self.east_divergence = None
# East location
self.altitude_divergence = None
# Altitude
self.parent_conn, self.child_conn = Pipe()
# Pipe
self.shared_location = Value('d', 0.0)
# Shared Location in (locationFile) in linux
self.shared_altitude = Value('d', 0.0)
# Shared Altitude in (altitudeFile) in linux
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self.diagonal = None
# Distance between North and East
self.workbook_name = '/mnt/c/linux/Results.xlsx'
# Excel sheet in Linux folder
self.workbook = openpyxl.load_workbook(self.workbook_name) # using openpyxl library
self.worksheet = self.workbook.active
# creating worksheet
self.excel_time = time.time()
# associate time to data in Excel
self.excel_row = 12
# specifying row in Excel associated w/time
self.syncing_excel_row = 12
# specifying row that not related in time
self.shared_wind = Value('d', 0.0)
# shared wind
self.bad_gps = None
self.bad_battery = None
self.iteration_counter = 0
self.x_position_array_1 = []
self.y_position_array_1 = []
self.z_position_array_1 = []
self.x_position_array_2 = []
self.y_position_array_2 = []
self.z_position_array_2 = []
def monitor_for_divergence_location(self, threshold=100):

# (2) is altitude

while True:
north_distance = self.Vehicle1.location.local_frame.north - self.Vehicle2.location.local_frame.north
east_distance = self.Vehicle1.location.local_frame.east - self.Vehicle2.location.local_frame.east
self.diagonal = la.norm([north_distance, east_distance])
self.shared_location.value = self.diagonal
f=open("locationfile.txt","w+")
# open, save file, so we can use it in SPC in TK
f.write(str(int(self.diagonal)))
f.close()
if self.diagonal < threshold:
# sys.stdout.write("\r" + 'L: ' + colored('Normal < 100m ', 'white', 'on_green') + ' D:' + str(self.diagonal))
# sys.stdout.flush() # only if something is changing in the same line
self.diverging_location = False
else:
self.north_divergence = abs(self.Vehicle1.location.local_frame.north self.Vehicle2.location.local_frame.north)
self.east_divergence = abs(self.Vehicle1.location.local_frame.east - self.Vehicle2.location.local_frame.east)
# sys.stdout.write("\r" + 'L: ' + colored('Abnormal > 100m', 'white', 'on_red') + ' D:' + str(self.diagonal))
# sys.stdout.flush()
self.diverging_location = True
time.sleep(.1)
break
def monitor_for_divergence_altitude(self, threshold=15):

# (2) is altitude

while True:
altitude_distance = (self.Vehicle1.location.global_frame.alt - self.Vehicle2.location.global_frame.alt)
self.shared_altitude.value = altitude_distance
f = open("altitudefile.txt", "w+") # open, save file, so we can use it in SPC in TK
f.write(str(int(altitude_distance)))
f.close()
if altitude_distance < threshold:
# sys.stdout.write("\r" +'
| A: ' + colored('Normal < 10m', 'white', 'on_green')+ ' D:' +
str(altitude_distance) + ' m')
# sys.stdout.flush() # only if something is changing in the same line
self.diverging_altitude = False
else:
self.altitude_divergence = abs((self.Vehicle1.location.global_frame.alt self.Vehicle2.location.global_frame.alt))

70

# sys.stdout.write("\r" +'
str(altitude_distance) + ' m')
# sys.stdout.flush()
self.diverging_altitude = True
time.sleep(.1)
break

| A: ' + colored('Abnormal > 10m', 'white', 'on_red') + ' D:' +

def wind_update(self):
# graping wind value from Vehicle 1
while True:
if self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_SPD'] != self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_WIND_SPD']:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_WIND_SPD'] = self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_SPD']
if self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_DIR'] != self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_WIND_DIR']:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_WIND_DIR'] = self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_DIR']
if self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_DIR_Z'] != self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_WIND_DIR_Z']:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_WIND_DIR_Z'] = self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_DIR_Z']
if self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_TURB'] != self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_WIND_TURB']:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_WIND_TURB'] = self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_TURB']
time.sleep(.5)
break
def download_mission(self):
'''Downloads the current mission and returns it in a list.'''
missionlist = []
cmds = self.Vehicle1.commands
cmds.download()
cmds.wait_ready()
for cmd in cmds:
missionlist.append(cmd)
return missionlist
def upload_mission(self, aFileName):
'''Upload a mission from a file.'''
# Read mission from file
missionlist = aFileName
cmds = self.Vehicle2.commands
cmds.clear()
'''Add new mission to vehicle 2'''
for command in missionlist:
cmds.add(command)
self.Vehicle2.commands.upload()
def excel_update(self):
if time.time() - self.excel_time > .5:
self.excel_row += 1
self.worksheet['B' + str(self.excel_row)].value = time.time()
if self.diagonal is not None:
self.worksheet['C' + str(self.excel_row)].value = self.diagonal
if self.Vehicle1 and self.Vehicle2 is not None:
self.worksheet['D' + str(self.excel_row)].value = self.Vehicle1.location.global_frame.alt self.Vehicle2.location.global_frame.alt
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self.worksheet['F' + str(self.excel_row)].value = self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_SPD']
self.worksheet['G' + str(self.excel_row)].value = self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_DIR']
self.worksheet['H' + str(self.excel_row)].value = self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_DIR_Z']
self.worksheet['I' + str(self.excel_row)].value = self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_TURB']
self.worksheet['J' + str(self.excel_row)].value = self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP']
self.worksheet['E' + str(self.excel_row)].value = self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP']
self.excel_time = time.time()
def syncing_excel_update(self, entering=True, syncing_type=None, sync_length=None):
if entering:
self.syncing_excel_row += 1
self.worksheet['L'+ str(self.syncing_excel_row)].value = 'Detect'
self.worksheet['K'+ str(self.syncing_excel_row)].value = syncing_type
self.worksheet['M' + str(self.syncing_excel_row)].value = time.time()
else:
self.worksheet['N' + str(self.syncing_excel_row)].value = time.time()
self.worksheet['O' + str(self.syncing_excel_row)].value = sync_length
def sim_speed_update(self):
if self.diagonal > 1000:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'] = 5
print(("\nV2 Simulation Speed: ") + colored(self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'], 'red','on_yellow'))
if self.diagonal > 400 and self.diagonal < 1000:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'] = 4
print(("\nV2 Simulation Speed: ") + colored(self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'], 'red', 'on_yellow'))
if self.diagonal> 300 and self.diagonal < 400:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'] = 3
print(("\nV2 Simulation Speed: ") + colored(self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'], 'red', 'on_yellow'))
if self.diagonal > 100 and self.diagonal < 300:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'] = 2
print(("\nV2 Simulation Speed: ") + colored(self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'], 'red', 'on_yellow'))
if self.diagonal > 100 and self.diagonal < 10:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'] = 1
print(("\nV2 Simulation Speed: ") + colored(self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'], 'red', 'on_yellow'))
time.sleep(0.1)
def gps_fail(self):
while True:
print("%s" % self.Vehicle1.gps_0)
if self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_GPS_DISABLE'] == 0:
print(colored('GPS: rtk Fixed', 'green'))
self.bad_gps = False
else:
print(colored('Bad GPS Signal Health', 'red'))
self.bad_gps = True
time.sleep(.5)
break
def battery_warning(self):
while True:
print("%s" % self.Vehicle1.battery)
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if self.Vehicle1.parameters['BATT_LOW_MAH'] == 0:
print(colored('Battery Good', 'green'))
self.bad_battery = False
else:
print(colored('Battery Bad', 'red'))
self.bad_battery = True
time.sleep(.5)
break
def heartbeat_warning(self):
while True:
print "Last Heartbeat: %s" % self.Vehicle1.last_heartbeat
time.sleep(.5)
break
def save_position(self):
if self.iteration_counter % 1 == 0:
self.x_position_array_1 += [self.Vehicle1.location.local_frame.east]
self.y_position_array_1 += [self.Vehicle1.location.local_frame.north]
self.z_position_array_1 += [-self.Vehicle1.location.local_frame.down]
self.x_position_array_2 += [self.Vehicle2.location.local_frame.east]
self.y_position_array_2 += [self.Vehicle2.location.local_frame.north]
self.z_position_array_2 += [-self.Vehicle2.location.local_frame.down]

def main(self):
# TKinter
root = Tk()
root.geometry('1500x790')
root.title('Autonomy Monitoring Service (AMS)')
root.state('normal')
# root.configure(bg="light sky blue")
# Adding widgets to the root window
Label(root, text='Autonomy Monitoring Service (AMS)', font=('Verdana', 25)).pack(side=TOP, pady=15)
# l2 = Label(root, text="AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 2020",
#
font=('Verdana', 14)).pack(side=BOTTOM, pady=10)
l2 = Label(root, text="AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 2020", font=('Verdana', 14))
l2.place(relx=0.05, x=-10, y=790, anchor=W)
# label widget
l3 = Label(root, text="AMS System :", font=('Verdana', 12))
l3.place(relx=0.05, x=-10, y=110, anchor=W)
l4 = Label(root, text="Time :", font=('Verdana', 12))
l4.place(relx=0.05, x=-10, y=155, anchor=W)
l5 = Label(root, text="Start", font=('Verdana', 12))
l5.place(relx=0.05, x=70, y=155, anchor=W)
l6 = Label(root, text="End", font=('Verdana', 12))
l6.place(relx=0.05, x=300, y=155, anchor=W)
l7 = Label(root, text="Duration :", font=('Verdana', 12))
l7.place(relx=0.05, x=-10, y=200, anchor=W)
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l8 = Label(root, text="Environment Effect :", font=('Verdana', 12))
l8.place(relx=0.05, x=-10, y=665, anchor=W)
# l9 = Label(root, text="Maintenance Problem :", font=('Verdana', 12))
# l9.place(relx=0.05, x=-10, y=740, anchor=W)
l10 = Label(root, text="Statistic Process Control (SPC) for Location :", font=('Verdana', 12))
l10.place(relx=0.05, x=540, y=100, anchor=W)
l11 = Label(root, text="Statistic Process Control (SPC) for Altitude :", font=('Verdana', 12))
l11.place(relx=0.05, x=540, y=440, anchor=W)
l12 = Label(root, text="Operator \nDecision ", font=('Verdana', 12))
l12.place(relx=0.05, x=415, y=540, anchor=W)
l13 = Label(root, text="Starting Up State :", font=('Verdana', 12))
l13.place(relx=0.05, x=-10, y=245, anchor=W)
l14 = Label(root, text="Display info :", font=('Verdana', 12))
l14.place(relx=0.05, x=-10, y=290, anchor=W)
l15 = Label(root, text="Delta Location :", font=('Verdana', 12))
l15.place(relx=0.05, x=-10, y=465, anchor=W)
l16 = Label(root, text="Delta Altitude :", font=('Verdana', 12))
l16.place(relx=0.05, x=-10, y=500, anchor=W)
l17 = Label(root, text="Question :", font=('Verdana', 12))
l17.place(relx=0.05, x=-10, y=555, anchor=W)
# button widget
def connect_thr():
thread.start_new_thread(connect_ams, ())
# creates connection button
b1 = Button(root, text="Start", fg="black", font=('Verdana', 12), command=connect_thr)
b1.place(relx=0.05, x=110, y=110, anchor=W, height=30, width=95)
b1.configure(background="green") # Adding Colors
b2 = Button(root, text="Terminate", fg="black", font=('Verdana', 12))
b2.place(relx=0.05, x=210, y=110, anchor=W, height=30, width=95)
b2.configure(background="red") # Adding Colors
b3 = Button(root, text="Yes", fg="black", font=('Verdana', 12))
b3.place(relx=0.05, x=400, y=575, anchor=W, height=30, width=95)
b3.configure(background="green") # Adding Colors
b4 = Button(root, text="No", fg="black", font=('Verdana', 12))
b4.place(relx=0.05, x=400, y=610, anchor=W, height=30, width=95)
b4.configure(background="red") # Adding Colors
# Delete Button
b5 = Button(root, text='Clear info', command=lambda: T6.delete(1.0, END))
b5.place(relx=0.05, x=400, y=255, anchor=W, height=30, width=95)
b5.configure(background="grey") # Adding Colors
b6 = Button(root, text='Refresh Graphs', command=lambda: T6.delete(1.0, END))
b6.place(relx=0.05, x=1270, y=90, anchor=W, height=30, width=95)
b6.configure(background="grey") # Adding Colors
# Textbox Window
T1 = Text(root)
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T1.place(relx=0.05, x=330, y=95, anchor=NW, height=30, width=170)
quote = """ Active / Inactive"""
T1.insert(END, quote)
T2 = Text(root)
T2.place(relx=0.05, x=110, y=140, anchor=NW, height=30, width=170)
quote = str(time.ctime())
T2.insert(END, quote)
T3 = Text(root)
T3.place(relx=0.05, x=330, y=140, anchor=NW, height=30, width=170)
quote = str(datetime.now())
T3.insert(END, quote)
T4 = Text(root)
T4.place(relx=0.05, x=110, y=185, anchor=NW, height=30, width=170)
quote = str(time.time())
T4.insert(END, quote)
T5 = Text(root)
T5.place(relx=0.05, x=110, y=230, anchor=NW, height=30, width=170)
quote = """State Machine: """
T5.insert(END, quote)
T6 = Text(root)
S6 = Scrollbar(T6)
T6.place(relx=0.05, x=110, y=275, anchor=NW, height=170, width=390)
text = """ Steps & Information is here .... """
T6.insert(END, text)
S6.pack(side=RIGHT, fill=tk.Y)
T6.config(yscrollcommand=S6.set)
T7 = Text(root)
T7.place(relx=0.05, x=110, y=455, anchor=NW, height=30, width=390)
quote = """Normal / Divergent"""
T7.insert(END, quote)
T8 = Text(root)
T8.place(relx=0.05, x=110, y=490, anchor=NW, height=30, width=390)
quote = """Normal / Divergent"""
T8.insert(END, quote)
T9 = Text(root)
T9.place(relx=0.05, x=110, y=540, anchor=NW, height=90, width=280)
quote = """Questions for Operator/Decisions"""
T9.insert(END, quote)
T10 = Text(root)
T10.place(relx=0.05, x=150, y=650, anchor=NW, height=70, width=350)
quote = """WIND_SPD WIND_DIR WIND_DIR_Z WIND_TURB"""
T10.insert(END, quote)
# T11 = Text(root)
# T11.place(relx=0.05, x=150, y=730, anchor=NW, height=30, width=350)
# quote = """Failsafe /COMM. /GPS / ..."""
# T11.insert(END, quote)
#
# Statistical process control (SPC) .........
x_data_1, y_data_1 = [], []
fig_1 = pyplot.figure()
line_1, = pyplot.plot_date(x_data_1, y_data_1, '-', color='limegreen', label='Variation')
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Title_1 = pyplot.title('Process Control Chart (Location)')
ax1 = pyplot.ylabel("Distance (m)", fontsize=11)
ax2 = pyplot.xlabel("Time (s)", fontsize=11)
ax3 = pyplot.legend(bbox_to_anchor=(1.01, 0.8), loc=2, borderaxespad=0.)
ax4 = pyplot.axhline(y=100, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='red', label='Monitoring threshold')
ax5 = pyplot.axhline(y=-100, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='red')
ax6 = pyplot.axhline(y=60, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='magenta', label='Syncing threshold')
ax7 = pyplot.axhline(y=-60, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='magenta')
ax8 = pyplot.axhline(y=0, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='black', label='Baseline')
ax9 = pyplot.axhline(y=150, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='white')
ax10 = pyplot.axhline(y=-150, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='white')
# line.fill_between(line_1,0)
# Statistical process control (SPC) ......... 2
x_data_2, y_data_2 = [], []
fig_2 = pyplot.figure()
line_2, = pyplot.plot_date(x_data_2, y_data_2, '-', color='limegreen', label='Variation')
Title_2 = pyplot.title('Process Control Chart (Altitude)')
ax11 = pyplot.ylabel("Distance (m)", fontsize=11)
ax12 = pyplot.xlabel("Time (s)", fontsize=11)
ax13 = pyplot.legend(bbox_to_anchor=(1.01, 0.8), loc=2, borderaxespad=0.)
ax14 = pyplot.axhline(y=15, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='red')
ax15 = pyplot.axhline(y=-15, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='red')
ax16 = pyplot.axhline(y=10, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='magenta')
ax17 = pyplot.axhline(y=-10, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='magenta')
ax18 = pyplot.axhline(y=0, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='black')
ax19 = pyplot.axhline(y=25, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='white')
ax20 = pyplot.axhline(y=-25, xmin=0.0, xmax=1.0, color='white')
def animate(frame):
distance_1 = open("locationfile.txt", "r").read()
if distance_1 != '':
x_data_1.append(datetime.now())
y_data_1.append(int(distance_1))
if len(x_data_1) > 50:
x_data_1.pop(0)
y_data_1.pop(0)
line_1.set_data(x_data_1, y_data_1)
fig_1.gca().relim()
fig_1.gca().autoscale_view()
return line_1,
pyplotcanvas = FigureCanvasTkAgg(fig_1, root, animate)
pyplotcanvas.get_tk_widget().place(x=620, y=120, height=300, width=830)
ani = animation.FuncAnimation(fig_1, animate, interval=1000, blit=True)
pyplotcanvas.draw()
def animate(frame):
distance_2 = open("altitudefile.txt", "r").read()
if distance_2 != '':
x_data_2.append(datetime.now())
y_data_2.append(int(distance_2))
if len(x_data_2) > 50:
x_data_2.pop(0)
y_data_2.pop(0)
line_2.set_data(x_data_2, y_data_2)
fig_2.gca().relim()
fig_2.gca().autoscale_view()
return line_2,
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pyplotcanvas = FigureCanvasTkAgg(fig_2, root, animate)
pyplotcanvas.get_tk_widget().place(x=620, y=460, height=300, width=830)
ani = animation.FuncAnimation(fig_2, animate, interval=1000, blit=True)
pyplotcanvas.draw()
# Multiprocessing:
p2 = multiprocessing.Process(target=root.mainloop)
p2.start()

# AMS State Machine Codes start from here:
print(colored('\nAutonomy Monitoring Service is Active', 'white', 'on_magenta'))
sys.stdout.write("\r" + 'Time : ' + colored(time.ctime(), 'red'))
sys.stdout.flush()
# Start AMS Time. print in Excel:
time1 = time.ctime()
self.worksheet['C4'] = time1
print' '
time.sleep(.5)
# Main loop for the State Machine of AMS
while True:
# Update excel sheet
self.excel_update()
self.iteration_counter += 1
# self.save_position()

""" -------------------------------- Starting Up State -------------------------------- """
if self.machine.state == "Starting Up":
print(colored('\nI am in Starting Up State', 'blue', 'on_cyan'))
# Show Time
sys.stdout.write("\r" + 'Time : ' + colored(time.ctime(), 'red'))
sys.stdout.flush()
print' '
time.sleep(.1)
# # AMS Connecting to Vehicle 1 & Vehicle 2:
self.Vehicle1 = connect("udp:127.0.0.1:14551", wait_ready=True)
self.Vehicle2 = connect("udp:127.0.0.1:14571", wait_ready=True)
if connect:
print(colored('\nAMS is Connected to V1 and V2', 'green'))
time.sleep(.5)
# If both Vehicles already flying:
if self.Vehicle1.location.global_frame.alt > 10 and self.Vehicle2.location.global_frame.alt > 10:
print(('Note:') + colored(' Both vehicles are flying', 'green'))
# Reset Simulator Speed:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'] = 1
# # Do we really need this ???
# # making sure that Vehicle 2 is (Reset Mission)
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# while self.Vehicle2.mode == VehicleMode("GUIDED"):
#
self.Vehicle2.mode = VehicleMode("AUTO")
#
time.sleep(.1)
#
self.Vehicle2.mode = VehicleMode("GUIDED")
# No need to grip the mission list if they are both flying. we will do that in Monitoring state
missionlist = None
# I dont think that we should put the code to trigger mission list if change
# Go to Monitoring:
self.machine.set_state('Monitoring')
# if Both Vehicles are on ground:
else:
# Reset Simulator Speed:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'] = 1
missionlist = None
# show info to Operator
print(('Step (1):') + colored(' Downloading Mission from Vehicle 1', 'green'))
print(('Step (2):') + colored(' Clearing & Uploading Mission to Vehicle 2', 'green'))
# Grip Mission from V1 and upload it:
while missionlist != self.download_mission(): # Not Equal
missionlist = self.download_mission() # Equal
self.upload_mission(missionlist)
time.sleep(.5)
if self.Vehicle1.armed == True: # Stop Updating WPs
break
print(('Step (3):') + colored(' Stop updating WPs. Missionlist is Equal', 'green'))
time.sleep(.5)
# Trigger V1 for armed:
while self.Vehicle1.armed != True:
time.sleep(.5)
print(colored('Both Vehicles: Arming', 'green'))
self.Vehicle2.armed = self.Vehicle1.armed
time.sleep(.5)
# Trigger V1 for Auto Mode
while self.Vehicle1.mode != VehicleMode("AUTO"):
time.sleep(.5)
print(colored('Both Vehicles: Auto Mode', 'green'))
self.Vehicle2.mode = self.Vehicle1.mode
time.sleep(.5)
# Trigger V1 for TakeOff
while self.Vehicle1.location.global_frame.alt > 10 and self.Vehicle2.location.global_frame.alt > 10:
time.sleep(.02)
self.iteration_counter += 1
self.save_position()
print(colored('Both Vehicles: Taking off', 'green'))
# Go to Monitoring:
self.machine.set_state('Monitoring')
""" ------------------------------- Monitoring State --------------------------------- """
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if self.machine.state == 'Monitoring':
print(colored('I am in Monitoring State', 'blue', 'on_cyan'))
sys.stdout.write("\r" + 'Time : ' + colored(time.ctime(), 'red'))
sys.stdout.flush()
print' '
time.sleep(.5)
# print Wind Direction for V1 (For Example)
print "Wind Dir: %s" % self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_WIND_DIR']
print' '
asked = False
asked_time = 0
while True:
self.monitor_for_divergence_location() # Monitoring Waypoint
self.monitor_for_divergence_altitude() # Monitoring Altitude
self.gps_fail()
# GPS FailSafe
self.battery_warning()
# Battery FailSafe
self.wind_update()
# Monitoring Wind
# self.parameters_update()
# Updating Parameters
# self.smooth_sim_speed_update()
# controlling SIM Speed
self.excel_update()
# Update excel sheet
self.iteration_counter += 1
self.save_position()
# if There is Divergent:
if self.diverging_location or self.diverging_altitude and not asked and self.Vehicle1.armed is True:
# AMS will Ask the Operator if he knew about Divergent and if he want to Sync immediately:
# Question 1:
answer1 = 'y' # raw_input(colored('\nAre you Responsible? [y/n] ', 'red'))
if answer1 == 'y':
# Question 2:
answer2 = 'y' # raw_input(colored('\nDo we sync with you? [y/n] ', 'red'))
if answer2 == 'y':
# Go Syncing
self.machine.set_state('Syncing')
break
else:
asked = True
asked_time = time.time()
print(colored('\nOk, but I will ask you again in 15 Seconds', 'red'))
else:
print(colored('\nAction Taken: V2 will Sync to V1 for more Observing', 'red'))
# Go Syncing
self.machine.set_state('Syncing')
break
# after 15 seconds ask again:
if time.time() - asked_time > 15 and asked:
# Question 3
answer2 = raw_input(colored('\nDo we sync with you? [y/n] ', 'red'))
if answer2 == 'y':
# Go Syncing
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self.machine.set_state('Syncing')
break
else:
asked = True
asked_time = time.time()
if not self.diverging_location or self.diverging_altitude:
asked = False
if self.bad_gps:
# asked = False
self.machine.set_state('FailSafe')
break
if self.bad_battery:
# asked = False
self.machine.set_state('FailSafe')
break
# Trigger V1 and V2 for disarm:
if self.Vehicle1.armed is False and self.Vehicle2.armed is False:
print(colored('\nBoth Vehicles: DISARMED on Ground', 'green'))
# Go to Terminating
self.machine.set_state('Pre-Terminating')
break

""" -------------------------------- FailSafe State --------------------------------- """
if self.machine.state == "FailSafe":
print(colored('\nI am in FailSafe State', 'blue', 'on_cyan'))
# Show Time
sys.stdout.write("\r" + 'Time : ' + colored(time.ctime(), 'red'))
sys.stdout.flush()
print' '
print' '
time.sleep(.1)
while True:
self.monitor_for_divergence_location() # Monitoring Waypoint
self.monitor_for_divergence_altitude() # Monitoring Altitude
self.wind_update()
# Monitoring Wind
self.gps_fail()
# GPS Failsafe
self.battery_warning()
# Battery Failsafe
self.excel_update()
# Update excel sheet
self.iteration_counter += 1
self.save_position()
# print(" GPS: %s" % self.Vehicle1.gps_0)
if self.bad_gps is True:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_GPS_DISABLE'] = self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_GPS_DISABLE']
if not self.bad_gps and not self.bad_battery:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_GPS_DISABLE'] = self.Vehicle1.parameters['SIM_GPS_DISABLE']
print(colored('GPS: rtk Fixed', 'green'))
# Go to Monitoring:
self.machine.set_state('Monitoring')
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break
if self.bad_battery is True:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['BATT_LOW_MAH'] = self.Vehicle1.parameters['BATT_LOW_MAH']
if not self.bad_battery and not self.bad_gps:
self.Vehicle2.parameters['BATT_LOW_MAH'] = self.Vehicle1.parameters['BATT_LOW_MAH']
print(colored('Battery Good', 'green'))
# Go to Monitoring:
self.machine.set_state('Monitoring')
break
""" -------------------------------- Syncing State --------------------------------- """
if self.machine.state == 'Syncing':
print(colored('\nI am in Syncing State', 'blue', 'on_cyan'))
sys.stdout.write("\r" + 'Time : ' + colored(time.ctime(), 'red'))
sys.stdout.flush()
print' '
# Update Excel sheet
new_sync = True
enter_time =time.time()
# Set Vehicle 2 to GUIDED Mode
self.Vehicle2.mode = VehicleMode("GUIDED")
print(('Step (3):') + colored(' Vehicle 2 : GUIDED Mode', 'green'))
# Send Vehicle 2 to Vehicle 1 by using Simple goto command
self.Vehicle2.simple_goto(self.Vehicle1.location.global_relative_frame)
# Set Simulator Speed
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'] = 3
print(("V2 Simulation Speed: ") + colored(self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'], 'red', 'on_yellow'))
# missionlist = None
while True:
self.monitor_for_divergence_location(threshold=60) # Monitoring Waypoint
self.monitor_for_divergence_altitude(threshold=10) # Monitoring Altitude
self.excel_update()
# Update excel sheet
self.iteration_counter += 1
self.save_position()
'''If only divergent in Altitude'''
if self.diverging_altitude and self.Vehicle1.armed is True:
# Update Excel sheet
if new_sync:
self.syncing_excel_update(entering=True, syncing_type='Altitude')
new_sync = False
# show info to Operator
print(colored(' Altitude Only', 'magenta'))
# Grip Mission from Vehicle 1
missionlist = self.download_mission()
self.upload_mission(missionlist)
# Simple goto command
self.Vehicle2.simple_goto(self.Vehicle1.location.global_relative_frame)
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'''If only divergent in Location'''
if self.diverging_location and self.Vehicle1.armed is True:
# Update Excel sheet
if new_sync:
self.syncing_excel_update(entering=True, syncing_type='Waypoints')
new_sync = False
# show info to Operator
print(colored(' Location Only', 'magenta'))
# Grip Mission from Vehicle 1
missionlist = self.download_mission()
self.upload_mission(missionlist)
# Simple goto command
self.Vehicle2.simple_goto(self.Vehicle1.location.global_relative_frame)

'''If Both divergent in Location and Altitude '''
if self.diverging_location and self.diverging_altitude and self.Vehicle1.armed is True:
# Update Excel sheet
if new_sync:
self.syncing_excel_update(entering=True, syncing_type='WPs & Alt')
new_sync = False
# show info to Operator
print(colored(' Location & Altitude', 'magenta'))
# Grip Mission from Vehicle 1
missionlist = self.download_mission()
self.upload_mission(missionlist)
# Simple goto command
self.Vehicle2.simple_goto(self.Vehicle1.location.global_relative_frame) # Send vehicle

'''If No Divergent, do some steps'''
if not self.diverging_location and not self.diverging_altitude and self.Vehicle1.armed is True:
# Set Simulator Speed
self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'] = 1
# show Simulator Speed to Operator
print(("\nV2 Simulation Speed: ") + colored(self.Vehicle2.parameters['SIM_SPEEDUP'], 'red',
'on_yellow'))
# Grip Mission from Vehicle 1
missionlist = self.download_mission()
self.upload_mission(missionlist)
# show info to Operator
print(('Step (1):') + colored(' Downloading Mission from Vehicle 1', 'green'))
print(('Step (2):') + colored(' Clearing & Uploading Mission to Vehicle 2', 'green'))
self.Vehicle2.mode = VehicleMode("AUTO")
print(('Step (3):') + colored(' Vehicle 2 : AUTO Mode', 'green'))
self.Vehicle2.commands.next = self.Vehicle1.commands.next
print(colored('V2 Reached there with new Missionlist', 'green'))
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self.syncing_excel_update(entering=False, sync_length=time.time()-enter_time)
new_sync = True
# print Correction Time
print("\nCorrection:" + colored(' '+ str(time.time()-enter_time) + ' Seconds', 'green', 'on_white'))
# Go to Terminating
self.machine.set_state('Monitoring')
break
""" -------------------------------- Terminating State ------------------------------ """
if self.machine.state == 'Pre-Terminating':
print(colored('\nI am in Pre-Terminating State', 'blue', 'on_cyan'))
sys.stdout.write("\r" + 'Time : ' + colored(time.ctime(), 'red'))
sys.stdout.flush()
print' '
time.sleep(2)
asked = False
asked_time = time.time()
while True:
self.excel_update() # Update excel sheet
self.iteration_counter += 1
self.save_position()
# Question 1
answer1 = raw_input(colored('\nDo you want to Terminate AMS ? [y/n] ', 'red'))
if answer1 == 'y':
print(colored('AMS will be Terminated in 5 Seconds', 'white','on_green'))
time.sleep(6)
print(colored('\nAutonomy Monitoring Service is Not Active', 'white', 'on_magenta'))
sys.stdout.write("\r" + 'End Time : ' + time.ctime())
sys.stdout.flush()
print'\n'
# Two Exits for multiprocessors
exit()
exit()
else:
while True:
sys.stdout.write("\r" + colored('AMS will stand by for Manual Terminating ...\n', 'red'))
sys.stdout.flush()

""" -------------------------------- End of State Machine ------------------------------ """

try:
AMS = AutonomyMonitoringService()
AMS.main()
AMS.workbook.save(AMS.workbook_name)

except KeyboardInterrupt:
print(colored('\n\nI am in Terminating State', 'blue', 'on_cyan'))
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sys.stdout.write("\r" + 'End Time : ' + colored(time.ctime(), 'red'))
sys.stdout.flush()
print'\n'
print(' Finally was hit\n\n')
AMS.workbook.save(AMS.workbook_name)
fig = plt.figure(figsize=[15, 10])
ax = plt.axes(projection='3d')
ax.plot3D(AMS.x_position_array_1, AMS.y_position_array_1, AMS.z_position_array_1, 'red', label='Vehicle 1')
ax.plot3D(AMS.x_position_array_2, AMS.y_position_array_2, AMS.z_position_array_2, 'blue', label='Vehicle 2')
ax.set_title('3D path')
ax.set_xlabel('East Position')
ax.set_ylabel('North Position')
ax.set_zlabel('Altitude')
ax.legend(frameon=False, loc='upper right', ncol=1)
plt.savefig("3dfig.png")
plt.show()
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Appendix B. Testing Simulation Results

Location + Environment
Autonomy Monitoring Service (AMS)
Trials
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Sum
Weighted Mean
Max
Min
Range
Variance (s²)
Weighted StdDev

Mission
Duration
(min)
9.0
10.6
9.40
9.06
15.19
10.55
11.75
10.04
9.6
95.2
10.7
15.2
9.0
6.2
3.75
1.9

Injected Divergence
Event
Type
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None

None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None

Detect
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Total Detections
Syncing Time (s)
Numbers in
Mission
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None

C Chart for Location (m)

C Chart for Altitude (m)

(n)

UCL

Mean

LCL

UCL

Mean

LCL

273.0
280.0
312.0
297.0
264.0
327.0
390.0
336.0
278.0
2757.0
306.3
390.0
264.0
126.0
1603.3

34.3
2.4
17.0
8.2
74.1
19.6
25.2
38.6
59.5
279.0
30.1
74.1
2.4
71.7
554.8
22.5

20.7
0.4
8.4
3.0
52.4
10.1
14.0
24.0
40.4
173.3
18.5
52.4
0.4
52.0
302.8
16.6

7.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
30.7
0.6
2.8
9.3
21.4
71.7
7.4
30.7
0.0
30.7
121.4
10.5

4.8
4.0
1.8
0.9
4.8
1.0
1.9
1.4
4.7
25.2
2.7
4.8
0.9
3.9
2.9
1.7

1.3
1.0
0.3
0.1
1.3
0.1
0.3
0.2
1.3
5.8
0.6
1.3
0.1
1.3
0.3
0.6

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Sample

C Chart for Location (m)

C Chart for Altitude (m)

(n)

UCL

Mean

LCL

UCL

Mean

LCL

580
597
965
1480

25.89
25.08
32.11
13.24

14.47
13.9
19.03
5.93

3.06
2.72
5.94
0

2.331
1.311
17.8
2.33

0.41
0.15
8.87
0.41

0
0
0
0

1450
1644
766

30.66
36.19
137.63

17.95
22.09
106.65

5.24
7.99
75.67

2.47
2.39
14.79

0.454
0.43
6.91

0
0
0

1693
355
9530.0
1058.9
1693.0
355.0
1338.0
263436.1

42.14
24.8
367.7
38.8
137.6
13.2
124.4
1382.8
32.4

26.65
13.69
240.4
25.0
106.7
5.9
100.7
932.8
26.5

11.17
2.59
114.4
11.3
75.7
0.0
75.7
568.4
20.5

3.08
2.642
49.1
5.0
17.8
1.3
16.5
38.5
5.8

0.65
0.5
18.8
1.8
8.9
0.2
8.7
11.1
3.1

0
0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Sample

Altitude + Environment

1
2
3
4

Mission
Duration
(min)
16.9
17.5
30.15
15

5
6
7

17.7
20.43
11.6

8
9
Sum
Weighted Mean
Max
Min
Range
Variance (s²)
Weighted StdDev

20.6
5.6
155.5
15.8
30.1
5.6
24.5
45.1
6.7

Trials

Autonomy Monitoring Service (AMS)
Total Detections
Injected Divergence
Detect Syncing Time (s)
Numbers in
Event
Type
Mission
None
None
No
None
None
None
None
No
None
None
None
None
No
None
None
None
Altitude
Yes
2.4
2
Location
Yes
6.8
None
None
No
None
None
None
None
No
None
None
None
Altitude
Yes
2.4
None
Altitude
Yes
None
None
No
None
None
None
None
No
None
None
11.6
2.0
3.9
6.8
2.4
4.4
6.5
2.5
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Location + Divergent

1
2

Mission
Duration
(min)
13.1
12.5

3
4

11.8
8.1

5

9.4

6

10.2

7

10.36

8

8.9

9

9.9

Sum
Weighted Mean
Max
Min
Range
Variance (s²)
Standard Deviation (s)
Weighted StdDev

94.2
9.9
13.1
8.1
4.9
2.7
1.7
1.7

Trials

Autonomy Monitoring Service (AMS)
Total Detections
Injected Divergence
Detect Syncing Time (s)
Numbers in
Event
Type
Mission
1
Location
Yes
4.5
1
1
Location
Yes
7.6
3
Location
Yes
4.1
Location
Yes
6.3
1
Location
Yes
10.4
1
1
Location
Yes
3
2
Location
Yes
6.2
1
Location
Yes
6.8
8
Location
Yes
11.9
2
Location
Yes
2.7
Location
Yes
6.5
3
Location
Yes
10.7
Location
Yes
2.4
4
Location
Yes
6.4
5
Location
Yes
7.1
1
Location
Yes
7.7
4
2
Location
Yes
11.5
3
Location
Yes
6.2
4
Location
Yes
10.5
1
Location
Yes
6.57
9
2
Location
Yes
13.3
3
Location
Yes
6.56
4
Location
Yes
10.7
5
Location
Yes
2.9
6
Location
Yes
6.8
7
Location
Yes
2.8
8
Location
Yes
6.3
9
Location
Yes
7
1
Location
Yes
5.2
16
2
Location
Yes
2.3
3
Location
Yes
6.6
4
Location
Yes
5.2
5
Location
Yes
3
6
Location
Yes
6.9
7
Location
Yes
2.3
8
Location
Yes
2.8
9
Location
Yes
4
10
Location
Yes
12.5
11
Location
Yes
4.1
12
Location
Yes
6.4
13
Location
Yes
8.3
14
Location
Yes
10.5
15
Location
Yes
2.9
16
Location
Yes
6.2
1
Location
Yes
12.5
5
2
Location
Yes
5.7
3
Location
Yes
11.8
4
Location
Yes
5.45
5
Location
Yes
10.6
330.3
49.0
6.7
5.4
13.3
16.0
2.3
1.0
11.0
15.0
10.0
23.8
3.2
4.9
3.2
4.9
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C Chart for Location (m)

C Chart for Altitude (m)

(n)

UCL

Mean

LCL

UCL

Mean

LCL

430
424

44.06
37.91

28.15
23.4

12.23
8.89

2.765
2.3

0.547
0.4

0
0

411
269

35

21.19

7.38

4.69

1.29

0

364

76.11

54.06

32

6.22

1.99

0

354

72.92

51.41

29.9

4.6

1.25

0

405

80.82

57.98

35.13

6.61

2.18

0

381

90.11

65.78

41

5.66

1.72

0

376

78.91

56.39

33.86

6.18

1.97

0

3414.0
379.3
430.0
269.0
161.0
2411.0
49.1

515.8
58.5
90.1
35.0
55.1
475.8
21.8
27.8

358.4
40.5
65.8
21.2
44.6
310.0
17.6
21.1

200.4
22.5
41.0
7.4
33.6
177.6
13.3
14.6

39.0
4.4
6.6
2.3
4.3
2.6
1.6
2.1

11.3
1.3
2.2
0.4
1.8
0.4
0.7
0.8

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Sample

Altitude + Divergent

1
2

Mission
Duration
(min)
9.14
8.55

3
4

8.8
8.37

1
1

5
6

8.59
8.19

1
1

7

9.8

1

Trials

1
1

2

8

9.6

1
2

9

12.1

1st

2

Sum
Weighted Mean
Max
Min
Range
Variance (s²)
Weighted StdDev

83.2
9.2
12.1
8.2
3.9
1.5
1.2

Autonomy Monitoring Service (AMS)
Total Detections
Detect Syncing Time (s)
Numbers in
Mission
Altitude
Yes
2.4
1
Altitude
Yes
2.2
2
Location
Yes
5.1
Altitude
Yes
2.4
1
Altitude
Yes
3.2
6
Location
Yes
3.9
Location
Yes
8.3
Location
Yes
11.1
Location
Yes
4.0
Location
Yes
7.6
Altitude
Yes
2.4
1
Altitude
Yes
2.3
5
Location
Yes
5.0
Location
Yes
3.1
Location
Yes
17.9
Location
Yes
10.3
Altitude
Yes
2.3
7
Location
Yes
5.1
Location
Yes
6.8
Altitude
Yes
2.7
Location
Yes
12.5
Location
Yes
3.7
Location
Yes
7.5
Altitude
Yes
2.1
6
Altitude
Yes
2.0
Location
Yes
3.6
Location
Yes
5.9
Location
Yes
2,8
Location
Yes
6.7
Altitude
Yes
3.2
17
Location
Yes
4.0
Location
Yes
5.9
Location
Yes
11.3
Location
Yes
3.2
Location
Yes
6.7
Altitude
Yes
2.0
Location
Yes
7.8
Location
Yes
3.3
Location
Yes
7.0
Location
Yes
2.7
Location
Yes
7.1
Location
Yes
3.3
Location
Yes
6.8
Location
Yes
9.2
Location
Yes
3.2
Location
Yes
7.0
246.2
46.0
5.5
17.9
2.0
15.9
11.4
3.4

Injected Divergence
Event
Type
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C Chart for Location (m)

C Chart for Altitude (m)

(n)

UCL

Mean

LCL

UCL

Mean

LCL

666
657

73.23
58.63

51.67
39.63

30.1
20.81

9.47
10.22

3.7
4.13

0
0

665
654

42.77
53.99

27.14
35.99

11.51
18

8.2
11.12

3
4.65

0
0

664
648

53.05
50.02

35.24
32.83

17.43
15.64

5.48
8.41

1.64
3.11

0
0

744

59.32

40.28

21.24

11.43

4.84

0

758

26.27

14.75

3.23

7.39

2.57

0

949

52.64

34.92

17.19

7.3

2.53

0

6405.0
711.7
949.0
648.0
301.0
9552.8

469.9
51.9
73.2
26.3
47.0
163.1
12.8

312.5
34.5
51.7
14.8
36.9
100.5
10.0

155.2
17.1
30.1
3.2
26.9
53.3
7.3

79.0
8.7
11.4
5.5
6.0
3.8
1.9

30.2
3.3
4.8
1.6
3.2
1.1
1.1

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Sample
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